Edward Cardwell and the reform of the British Army, 1868-1874 by Dubs, Dennis R
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
1-1-1966
Edward Cardwell and the reform of the British
Army, 1868-1874
Dennis R. Dubs
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dubs, Dennis R., "Edward Cardwell and the reform of the British Army, 1868-1874" (1966). Student Work. 394.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/394
EDWARD CARDWELL AND THE REFORM 
OF THE,BRITISH ARMY, 1868-1874
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Department of History 
and the
Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies 
University of Omaha
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts
by
Dennis R. Dubs 
January 1966
UMI Number: EP73032
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
DIsswtMian: Publishing
UMI EP73032
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate 
Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.
C h a i r m a n D e p a r t m e n t !
Graduate Committee
Name
PREFACE
Although long interested in the dramatic aspects of 
military history, I must admit that I had little interest in 
the subject of military reform until the autumn of 1964. In 
a seminar conducted by Dr. A. Stanley Tri.ckett on the reform 
movements in nineteenth century Britain, I became aware of 
the military reforms which Edward Cardwell instituted in 
the British Army during his secretaryship at the War Office 
between 1868 and 1874. After writing a seminar paper on 
one aspect of the Cardwell reforms, I became deeply inter­
ested in all the military reforms which he introduced. This 
thesis is the result of that interest.
Only one work, Robert Biddulph's Lord Cardwell at 
the War Office, has been devoted to the full nature of these 
reforms. Written by Cardwell's personal secretary at the 
War Office and published in 1904, this work provides a good 
description of the Cardwell reforms, but due to Biddulph's 
close relationship with Cardwell it lacks■a sense of 
historical objectivity. Then too, the date of publication 
prevented the author from reaching any conclusions about the
impact of the Cardwell reforms on the British Army during 
the period immediately preceeding the First World War.
In recent years Arvel B. Erickson has written a 
biography of "Edward T. Cardwell: Peelite," and has pub­
lished it in the Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 2, (1959). In this work, the first
biography of the life of Cardwell, Erickson recognizes that•>
in the history of nineteenth century Britain Cardwell's 
importance largely rests on his achievements as an Army 
reformer. Unlike Biddulph, however, Erickson limits his 
evaluation of the Cardwell reforms by looking at them as 
the apex of a political career which exhibited tremendous 
talent for administrative duties. While such a point of 
view is undoubtedly true, it is nevertheless too narrow.
Recognizing the weaknesses of both Biddulph's work 
and Erickson's biography, I have sought to re-evaluate the 
Cardwell reforms. The task of preparing this thesis has not 
been easy as the decisions involved in its organization and 
composition were difficult and frustrating to say the least. 
But decisions were made and conclusions were drawn,, and I 
assume all responsibility for any shortcomings that may 
have resulted. Now that the task is finally finished I can
iv
truly understand what the poet Kahlil Gibran meant when he 
wrote, "Your joy is your sorrow unmasked."
I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to 
Dr. A. Stanley Trickett for his aid and encouragement in 
the preparation of this thesis. Without his advice and 
counsel this work might never have been completed. I also 
wish to thank the other members of the history faculty at 
the University of Omaha as each one of them has been of 
some help to me at one time or other during my graduate 
career thus far. Finally, I wish to thank Miss Ella Jane 
Dougherty for her help in locating books from libraries 
all over the country through the facilities of inter-library 
loan.
January 1966 Dennis R. Dubs.
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CHAPTER I
SETTING THE STAGE
Heavily burdened with immense military expenditures
during the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain was determined
to reduce her large military establishment following
Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo in 1815.1 In the interest
of national finance the Duke of Wellington recognized that a
general reduction of the military forces was imperative, but
he urged Parliament to refrain from embarking on a policy of
retrenchment that would destroy the regiments and battalions
which had served him so faithfully on the continent. Fearful
of impairing Britain's fighting capability in the future,
military economists in Parliament heeded the Duke's advice
and applied much of their "scrapping and scraping" to the
2supporting services of those combatant units. It was not 
possible, however, to limit all the military reductions to
: l
Robert Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office 
(London: John Murray, 1904), p. 38. Hereafter cited as
Biddulph.
r 2George Arthur, From Wellington to Wave11 (London: 
Hutchinson and Co., y\1942/f, P- 63. Hereafter cited as 
Arthur.
1
2transportation and supply sections as Britain's Army totaled
3297,364 men in June 1814. With little need of a large
military establishment in the post-war years, additional
reductions were authorized in the ranks of the combatant 
4
units. By 1821, only six years after Waterloo, the British 
Army was reduced to approximately 100,000 men of whom 50,000
were stationed at home, 30,000 were distributed in the various
5
colonies, and 20,000 were located in India.
With Napoleon removed from the European political 
arena, no forseeable danger prevented Great Britain from 
reducing her Army to this extent. In need only of a small 
force to preserve order at home and to maintain control of 
her colonies abroad, Britain could afford to restore her
traditional reliance on the defensive protection which the
6English Channel and the Royal Navy offered. Surrounded
3
Great Britain, British Sessional Papers, House of 
Commons, edited by Edgar L. Erickson, "Estimates of Regular 
and Militia Forces,” IX (1814-1815), 321. Hereafter cited
as B. S_. P.
4
Arthur, p. 63.
5Eric William Sheppard, A Short History of the British 
Army (4th ed.; London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1950), 
p. 206. Hereafter cited as Sheppard.
Peter Gibbs, The Battle of the Alma (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), p. 12. Hereafter cited 
as Gibbs, Alma.
3by water, the insular position of the British Isles
offered its inhabitants a sense of security which
Coleridge poetically described:
'Ocean, 'mid his uproar wild,
Speaks safety to his island child.’
To be sure, the British did not forget their Army
in the years which followed. After 1821 it was periodically
increased in size until it reached approximately 140,000 
8
men in 1854. But m  spite of this increase in manpower, 
which was mainly distributed in the colonial stations, a 
corresponding concern was not given to the organizational 
and administrative needs of an Army spread around the world. 
With troops dispersed in small detachments throughout the. 
Empire, no provision was made for a system of periodic 
transfer during the enlistment period of twenty-one years. 
Living in isolated out-of-the-way places, the men became 
less, concerned with military drill or other activities that, 
would promote efficiency within their ranks. Instead, they
7
Great Britain, 3 Hansard1s Parliamentary Debates, 
CCXIV, 1078. Hereafter cited as Hansard1s. Mr. W. Fowler,
M. P., quoting Coleridge.
1 8Sheppard, p. 207; Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, The 
Age of Reform, 1815-1870, Vol. 13 of The Oxford History of 
England, ed. G. N. Clark (2nd ed., 14 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1962), p. 271. Hereafter cited as Woodward.
4married into native populations, settled on small farms to 
raise chickens, and grew fat from lack of activity.9
By 1850, the British Army was composed of little 
more than a confused hodge-podge of infantry battalions, 
cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries. The divisional 
and corps organization of the Peninsular Wars no longer 
existed. Regular maneuvers were no longer held, trans­
portation and supply sections were maintained only within 
a skeleton framework, and officers had neither professional 
skill nor attitude as commissions were obtained by the 
system of purchase.^9
Much of this degeneration was attributable to the 
state of dormancy which affected the organization and 
administration of the Army after the Napoleonic Wars.^^
It seemed that Wellington and Waterloo had proven the worth 
of the Army during its struggle with Napoleon; therefore, in 
the years that followed few attempts were " . . .  made to
12modify or improve the armament, equipment and methods . . . ."
When changes and adjustments were made, the modifications could
9Arthur, pp. 63-64. 
G^ibbs', Alma, p. 15.
10Ibid-, p, 64. 
^Sheppard, p. 207.
5best be described as piecemeal in character and patchwork
in nature which resulted in a "sorry-looking" and "loudly-
13creaking" machine.
The fact that the Army establishment became anti­
quated was largely due to no fault but its own.^ The cry 
for reform went up time and again both in and out of 
Parliament, but the Army high command continually turned 
a deaf ear. In 1837, for example, a Royal Commission,, 
presided over by Lord Howick (later Earl Grey), made 
numerous recommendations to the Army for correcting imper­
fections within its organization and administration. As 
its prime suggestion, the Royal Commission recommended that
the Secretary at War be made responsible for the entire
15
administration of the Army. Since the Duke of Wellington 
believed that military matters must be kept entirely 
separate from politics, he vigorously opposed this recom­
mendation and successfully led the fight against the 
acceptance of the proposals given by the Royal Commission.^
1 1Arthur, p. 64.
14 .Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present
(London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1914), pp. 149-150.
Hereafter cited as Wheeler.
.15 16 , . n
Arthur, p. 81. Ibid.
6Because Wellington personified the Army in its days of past
17
military glory, much of the Army was left in the condition
18which the Duke desired. .After all, as Wellington put it,
there could be nothing drastically wrong with the Army
19which had triumphed at Waterloo,
Not only did the Army high command oppose the reform
of its administration and organization, but it did little
to improve the circumstances of the common soldier. By
any standard, life in the enlisted ranks of the Army left
much to be desired. The men lived in crowded and unsanitary
barracks, existing on an improper diet, drinking impure
20water, and wearing inadequate clothing. As E. L. Woodward
■^Gibbs, Alma, p. 12.
18 "Against such changes— as the abolition of the 
Master-General, and the consolidation of the War Department 
under one Civil Head^-the Duke of Wellington, in official 
intercourse, had solemnly warned the Ministry of Lord 
Melbourne in 1838, and of Earl Russell in 1849. They both 
heeded his warnings', or in deference to his great experience 
in War and Politics, abided by his advice." As stated in 
Charles M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown; Their 
Administration and Government (2 vols.; London: John Murray, 
1869) II, 391. Hereafter cited as Clode.
■^Anthony Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914 
(London: Longmans, 1960), p. 193. Hereafter cited as Wood.
20Arvel B. Erickson, "Edward T. Cardwell: Peelite,"
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, XLIX,
Pt. 2 (1959), 68. Hereafter cited as Erickson.
7states, ". . . urinal tubs, which stood in the rooms during
the night were emptied out in the morning and used for
..21 , . .washing. As a result of Such conditions, the men were
easily susceptible to various diseases which attributed to
a death-rate among the home forces that was five times greater
than that of the civilian population. Living conditions were
even worse overseas with the death-rates also much higher.
Under such circumstances discipline could be maintained
only through the use of severe punishments such as branding
and flogging in an effort to prevent stealing, brawling,
22
drunkenness, and desertion.
In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend why such 
conditions were allowed to exist, especially when much of 
Great Britain was actively engaged in social, political, and-' 
economic reform. In general, three reasons can be cited for 
this disgraceful state of affairs. First of all, it was 
impossible to persuade Parliament to appropriate the necessary 
funds for financing reforms as the nation was involved in a 
mania for economy after 1815; therefore, military questions
21Woodward, p. 2 66, n. 2.
"^Erickson, p, 68; Woodward, p» 2 67.
gradually came to be considered in terms of economy alone. 
Secondly, Army officers were adverse to improving the living 
conditions of their troops just as they neglected to acquaint 
themselves with the technical aspects of their profession.
i
Thirdly, the public recognized that reforms were needed but
remained indifferent as it was convinced that reforms would
be impossible to put into effect. In addition, the public
failed to improve the situation by utilizing the enlisted
ranks of the service as a means of "reforming" the problem
men of the day. As a result, many good men often refrained
from "picking up the King's shilling," and the presence of
a large number of low caliber recruits was often used as an
2 3excuse to justify the lack of reform. Thus, a man who
was not a social outcast before enlisting in the Army soon
2 4became one when he did. With these attitudes permeating 
the whole of British society mid-way in the nineteenth 
century, conditions were hardly conducive to reform. The 
advent of war, however, would soon change this situation.
The opening of the Great Exhibition in London on 
May 1, 1851, was hailed by many.Victorian leaders as the
^^Ibid. ^^Gibbs, Alma, p. 13.
9beginning of a new era in international relations. It was
hoped that in the future peaceful economic competition
would replace military struggle,as the means of settling
2 5international differences. With the outbreak of the
Crimean War in 1854, such a dream was short lived. Excluding
drab colonial skirmishes within the Empire, the British Army
had not participated in a war since the struggle with 
2 6Napoleon. The Army, therefore, eagerly looked forward to
the Crimean War as an adventure in which it could re-capture
the "pools of military glory" in which it had bathed in
previous years. With the excitement of a fox hunt the
2 7British Army embarked for the Crimea, but once in the 
peninsula the Army discovered neither adventure nor glory; 
it experienced a nightmare instead.
Psychologically, the Crimean War was a shock to 
the Army establishment as it brought home the realities of
2 5John W. Dodds, The Age of Paradox: A Biography of
England, 1841-1851 (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc.,
1952), pp. 469-470.
2 6W. H. Goodenough and J. C. Dalton, The Army Book 
for the British Empire (London: Harrison and Sons, 1893), 
p. 24. Hereafter cited as Army Book.
27 . ,
Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 138. Hereafter
cited as Woodham-Smith.
Lord Bacon's proverbial addage, "'Let it suffice, that no
estate expect to be great that is not awake upon any just
2 8occasion of arming.'" As the British Army stumbled into
the Crimea, confusion reigned supreme. Combat revealed the
Army establishment to be almost totally unprepared for war;
military leadership was almost non-existent as most officers
were either inept or over-aged; and no clear-cut chain of
2 9
command existed. The systems of supply were inadequate
and frequently broke down; the troops were often left
30without adequate means for waging war* Matters became
even more confusing when officers ignored the advice of
their intelligence reports and left the transportation of
31
troops to chance. As casualties-and disease mounted,
deficiencies in the ranks became widespread as the supply
32
of reserve troops could not keep up with the demand.
The victims of this "system of mismanagement" were 
the British soldiers, and the horrors they suffered are too
2 8Statement by Lord Bacon as cited by "The Military 
Forces of the Crown," Edinburgh Review, CXXXIII (January, 
1871), 207. Hereafter cited as "Military Forces."
29 ' 30Erickson, p. 68. Arthur, p. 28.
31 32Woodham-Smith, p. 136. Wheeler, p. 149.
11
33well known to bear repetition. But in spite of privation,
suffering, and death, the fighting quality of the British
troops compensated for almost every lack in their leadership.
As Peter Gibbs credits in his book The Battle of the Alma,
the British soldiers saved the day for their leaders who did
3 4all but throw it away.
Responsibility for Britain's military ineptness cannot
t
be blamed on leadership alone as due credit must also be given
to the lack of an adequate administrative system. Immediately
prior to 1854, the business of the Army was managed by the
following eleven departments, all of which were independent
of each other and communicated by letter: the Secretary of
State for War and the Colonies; the Home Secretary; the General
Commanding-in-Chief; the Secretary at War; the Ordnance Office;
the Treasury; the Army Medical Department; the Audit Office;
the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital; the Board of General
35Officers; and the Paymaster-General. Dr. Andrew Smith,
^For a complete description of the mismanaged 
efforts of the British Army during the Crimean War see 
Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1954).
34
Gibbs, Alma, p. 14.
•^Appendix A, p. 138.
12
Director-General of the Army and Ordnance Medical Department,
when asked by the Sebastopol Committee investigating the
conduct of the Crimean War who his superior was, replied,
**'The Commander-in^-Chief, the Secretary at War, the Minister
of War, the Master-General of Ordnance, and I hardly know
36how many more.'"
At the outbreak of the Crimean War it was recognized
that unity in the Army administrative arrangement was badly
needed. Hastily, a scheme for amalgamating the various
departments was adopted, but this plan lacked defined
objectives for effecting.a purposeful amalgamation.
Accordingly, in June 1854, the War Office was separated
from the Colonial Office and placed under a newly created
3 7Secretary of State — the Secretary of State for War. In
December, the Commissariat Department was transferred from
38
the Treasury to the War Office. Early in February of 
the next year, the office of the Secretary at War was
3 6Great Britain, Parliament Papers, "Report of the 
Select Committee on the Army Before Sebastopol," IX (1885),
Pt. 1, 392, as cited by Erickson, p. 68, n. 6.
37Biddulph, p. 9; Erickson, p. 69. Hereafter, when 
referring to the Secretary of State for War the shortened 
title of Secretary of War will be used.
38Appendix A, p. 139.
39combined with the duties of the Secretary of War. In
March, the control of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers,
was removed from the Home Office and given to an Inspector
of Militia, who was made directly responsible to the
Secretary of War. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of War
assumed responsibility for the Army Medical Department and
40
the Army clothing establishment.
By 1856, the Secretary of War, having under his
control all the civil administrative offices of the Army,
was head of the whole administration of the Army at the
War Office. The only Army department which was not located
in the War Office at Pall Mall was the office of the General
Commanding-in-Chief whose office was located at the Horse
Guards. When the Secretary of War transferred the command
and discipline of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers
to the General Commanding-in-Chief in May 1855, the General
Commanding-in-Chief became the administrator of all the com-
41
batant branches of the Army. Technically, however, the
39Woodward, p. 292, n. 1. The office of Secretary 
at War continued to remain part of the duties of the 
Secretary of War until 1863, when it was finally abolished.
40Erickson, p. 69; "Military Forces," CXXXIII,
212-213.
41Biddulph, pp. vi-vn, 9.
14
General Commanding-in-Chief was subject to the civil
authority of the Secretary of War, but since his office
W&s physically separated from the War Office and communicated
'with it by letter, the office of the General Commanding-in-
42
Chief was considered a distinct department.
Thus, the immediate effect of the Crimean War was a
revamping of the Army administrative system from numerous
independent and mutually conflicting offices to two such
offices— the Secretary of War, responsible for the civil
administration of the Army, and the General Commanding-in-
Chief, responsible for the military command and discipline
43of the fighting forces.
At first glance, it would appear that such sweeping 
reforms in the Army administrative system would have removed 
from the War Office much of its inefficiency, mismanagement, 
and lack of organization. Perhaps this might have been the 
ease had the War Office been reconstructed under a clearly 
devised system. As it was, various departments were thrown
43Wheeler, pp. 175-176; Biddulph, p. 10.
43Sheppard, pp. 216-217. Hereafter when referring 
to the General Commanding-in-Chief, the title Which was 
adopted in 1887 will be used— Commander-in-Chief, Erickson, 
p. 67, n. 1.
together under one head without having been properly 
44
combined. At the end of the Crimean War the reconstructed
USLi Office consisted of part of the Colonial Office, part
Of the Ordnance Office, all of the Secretary at War's Office,
45
$Nirt of the Treasury, and part of the Home Office. Conse­
quently, duties were duplicated and further inefficiency 
resulted. Sir Robert Biddulph described this reconstruction 
ifI one word— catastrophe. ^
Administrative reform, however, was not the only 
lesson which the Crimean War had taught. On.the plea of 
the recent experience of mismanagement, suffering, and 
privation in the Crimea, the public urged that greater 
concern be given to the common soldier as a tribute to his 
efforts during the war. As a result, the Victoria Cross
for bravery was instituted in 1856, and it was open to all 
47
ranks. Military hospitals were built at Netley and
Hoolwich, and a medical school was established in 1859
48for the study and treatment of wounds and diseases.
44"Military Forces," CXXXIII, 213.
45 46Biddulph, p. vi. Ibid.
47 48Woodward, p. 2 92. Wood, pp. 203-204.
16
Likewise, sums were appropriated for the construction of
. 49
*6*ding rooms, gymnasia, and other recreational facilities.
With the defects of the British military system 
Clearly revealed in the Crimean experience and 'to a 
lesser degree by the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, rapid prog­
ress in the development of a reformed Army establishment
51
V33j nevertheless, not immediately forthcoming. During 
the interval between the close of the Crimean War and the 
Advent of the first Gladstone Ministry in late 1868, many 
Changes were made in the military system, but these changes
were mechanical in nature; few, if any, were fundamentally
. 52
organic.
The character of Army reform during this period can 
h& explained, in part, by the frequent changes in the office
49'Erickson, p. 69.
50The Indian Mutiny brought to light many defects in 
the inelastic system of recruitment in the British Army, 
for details see, "Inefficiency of the British Army," London 
Quarterly Review, CXXIX (October, 1870) , 278.
51
Sheppard, p. 215.
^Clode, II, 390. In a work of this kind it is 
extremely difficult to apply any sort of justice to the 
changes which occurred during this interval. Admittedly, 
cany changes were made, but it would be futile to list 
Cham all for they did not organically affect the structure 
Of the Army's organization. For a brief account of the 
Changes which occurred between 1854 and 1868 see Appendix A.
17
Of the Secretary of War since its institution in 1855.
&ord Panmure held the office for three years (1855-1858),
ftltd Sidney Herbert held it for two (1859-1861) , but in
JfcWO other instances the term of office did not last one 
53 . .year, Military legislation, therefore, was not governed
by uniform policy for any great lengths, and this contributed
'to. much vacillation in purpose and planning.
There seemed little hope of lifting the Army out of
Its rut as the War Office failed to provide it with an
IKS&inistration and organization which was more in harmony
With the requirements of the day. Prussia's fantastic rise
to. a powerful position of military strength, however, roused
iritain from her lethargy, not to panic, but to a healthy
54cense of weakness by military comparison. After Napoleon
crushed the Prussians at Jena in 1806, the British observed
tho Prussians as they gradually rebuilt their Army into - a
High state of efficiency and power. In the meantime Britain's
55Sliiitary strength dissipated with each succeeding generation.
5 TAppendix B, p. 146.
54J. S. Omond, Parliament and the Army, 1642-1904 
{Cambridge: The University Press, 1933), p. 106. Hereafter 
Cited as Omond.
55
Ibid. pp. 106-10 7.
In 1864, during the Schleswig-Holstein War, the Prussian 
Army tested its worth on the battlefields of Denmark. Two 
years later in the short Seven Weeks 1 War (Austro-Prussian 
fc&r) , the British were given additional proof of the 
efficiency and power of the Prussian Army by witnessing 
its rapid mobilization, its advanced weaponry, and its 
completeness in detail. The brilliant successes of the 
Prussian Army in these two. campaigns illustrated the power 
Of a nation which possessed a relatively small peacetime 
establishment, yet one which could be expanded at short 
notice to many times that strength. Britain realized that 
In the event of war with Prussia she could expect a decisive 
bl ow at an early moment. It, therefore, became a necessity
to place the total military strength of the country on the
56 .battlefield at the very outset of war. With the existing
S&ilitary system this was impossible.
The Crimean War brought to Great Britain the 
realization that many Army reforms were badly needed, but 
HO one came forward to make them a reality. With the shadow 
Of Prussian war-clouds rising over the continent radical
~*^ Army Do ok, pp. 44-45.
19
Changes in the military system were imperative. The 
military resources of the country had to be made more 
available on sudden emergencies than recent experience 
had shown them to be. The stage was set, but where was 
th© man of genius who would give impetus to a wise policy 
.and' guide it in its progress?
With the Liberal victory at the polls in November 
1068, William E. Gladstone became Britain's new Prime 
Minister. In his Cabinet Gladstone chose his able and 
respected friend Edward T. Cardwell to become Secretary 
Of War. Unknown but to fate, this Peelite from Liverpool 
W 6  to lead Britain's archaic Army establishment into an 
era of military reform which was unprecedented in British 
Ml story.
CHAPTER II
CARDWELL ARRIVES AT THE WAR OFFICE
Edward T. Cardwell was born in Liverpool on June 24, 
1813, during the height of the Napoleonic Wars As the son 
Of John Cardwell, a prosperous merchant with extensive 
business interests, young Edward was destined to receive an 
fXcellent education.• He prepared for the University at 
Winchester, and after completing his preparatory studies, 
entered Balliol College, Oxford, in 1832, where he did 
exceptionally well in his scholastic efforts. Possessing 
'OH excellent mind, which he diligently applied to all his 
tasks, Cardwell won an open scholarship and earned a double 
first class in classics and mathematics. Following the 
CSXapletion of his undergraduate studies, he was elected to 
ft fellowship where he continued to display his scholarly 
abilities.
■^Erickson, p. 5.
2Erickson, p. 6; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; Wheeler, p. 16. 
See also, George Stronach, "Edward Cardwell,” Dictionary of 
Rational Biography, III, 952. Hereafter cited as D. N. 13.
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In addition to pursuing his education at Oxford,
Cftrdwell formed life-long friendships with many able men who ■ 
Inter held high public office, including among others,
Sidney Herbert, Robert Lowe, Roundell Palmer, and William E.
3
Gladstone. In turn, each of these men later played vital 
r©les in Cardwell's political career.
After quitting the University, Cardwell was called 
‘to the bar in 1838 where he soon became quite prominent as 
a lawyer. His financial circumstances, however, allowed 
lUo to remain independent from a profession, and he decided 
to enter public service. In 1842, Cardwell chose to run 
for Parliament and was elected as a free-trade Conservative, 
representing Clitheroe.^ During his first few years in 
Parliament, Cardwell quietly acquainted himself with 
parliamentary processes without distinguishing himself in 
any particular manner. In the meantime, however, he developed 
a close political, as well as personal, relationship with
^Erickson, p. 6.
^Erickson, p. 6; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; Wheeler, p. 186; 
D. N. 13. , III, 952. Clitheroe was a small borough in the 
northeast corner of Lancashire.
5Sir Robert Peel. Their friendship was a natural one as 
Cardwell resembled Peel in character and industry,^ while 
Peel, in turn, admired Cardwell's special ability for 
handling financial and commercial affairs. By 1845,
Cardwell had so developed these talents he was firmly 
established as a reliable defender of commercial interests. 
That same year Peel rewarded him with an appointment to his 
Conservative Ministry as Secretary to the Treasury.
With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, a rupture 
Occurred in the Conservative Party between Peel and the 
protectionists. The wound was fatal, and Peel's Conservative 
Hinistry fell. In the period of political instability which 
followed, Cardwell remained true to his chief and, together 
with a small group of Peelites, continued to hold conservative 
views' in general politics and liberal views in regard to
o
Commercial questions. In 1847, during Cardwell's successful
^Erickson, p. 6; D. N. 13. , III, 952. Their relation­
ship became so close that on Peel's death in 1850, Cardwell 
was appointed his literary executor in conjunction with Lord 
t&ihon. Biddulph, p. 16.
6D. N. B. , III, 952.
7
Erickson, pp. 6-7; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; D. N. 13. ,
1X1, 952.
campaign for the Liverpool seat as an independent Conserva­
tive, he and other Peelites attempted to organize the free- 
tirade members of the Conservative Party into a separate 
'political body. The effort failed, but this group of 
moderate progressive statesmen (about forty in number) of 
liberal -conservative principles voted together so consistently
lor a decade thereafter, they were often referred to as the 
9fSNjlite Party.
As Liverpool 1s representative between 1847 and 1852,
Cardwell supported free-trade principles so consistently
that few of his constituents could find fault with him.^
In  the election of 1852, however, he lost his seat in the
ttOttse of Commons, but not in consequence of having voted
11
for the repeal of the Navigation Acts. His defeat came 
4# the result of a religious controversy arising from the 
Issuance of a Papal Bull in 1850, which divided England 
Into Territorial Sees and established a hierarchy of
^Erickson, pp. 8-9. ~^Ibid., p. 9.
■^George Stronach, author of Cardwell's biography 
In the Dictionary of National Biography, states that 
Cardwell lost his Liverpool seat in 1852 for having 
ttOted for the repeal of.the Navigation Acts. This is 
Otter nonsense for commercial Liverpool was committed to 
the repeal of the Navigation Acts just as was Cardwell.
D. N. B. , III, 952.
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*&i#hops. This action was widely denounced throughout the
Country, and in response to it, Lord John Russell introduced
I# Parliament an Ecclesiastical Title Bill to prevent the
M l  from being put into effect. Cardwell, along with other
Pt&lites, vigorously opposed the bill, but their efforts
Vcre in vain. As a result of this high-church position,
Cardwell alienated enough of Liverpool\s Protestant electors
12fey 1852 to prevent his election.
Cardwell contested another seat at Craigie, Ayrshire,
l&At same year, but again his high-church stand blocked his
return to Parliament. Early in January 1853, the Oxford
fC&t was vacated, and again Cardwell sought election. This
13M d  was successful as Cardwell's high-church convictions 
conservatism were more at home in the Oxford repre- 
fentation. -Even though Cardwell spent the rest of his public 
life in the House of Commons representing Oxford, he continued 
to hold the "Liverpool line" in his economic principles just
14
he had in the past.
■^Erickson, p. 10.
13Ibid., p. 12; D. N. B. , III, 952.
Erickson, p. 12.
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With the formation of Lord Aberdeen's coalition 
#QVernment in 1852, Cardwell was invited to become President 
the Board of Trade. In Lord Aberdeen's Ministry, which 
‘insisted of six Whigs, six Peelites, and one Radical, 
Cardwell assumed his position on the Board of Trade without
fe&ving a seat in the Cabinet as Whig leaders protested the
* 15J&trcre number of Peelites in the coalition. Cardwell's
itment, . aside from his party role, was met with almost 
tmiversal acceptance as he was.widely recognized as a 
learned financier with a healthy appetite for work. As 
president of the Board of Trade, Cardwell was presented with 
Ureal challenge for despite its partial reorganization in 
i, when a railway department was added, it remained in
& confused state of affairs. This challenge he eagerly 
4C«pted.16
During the Crimean War, Cardwell had little to do
With military matters, but his office skillfully handled
17ftll the commercial problems relating to it. These
15D. N.' B., Ill, 952. 16Erickson, p. 13.
~^Ibid. , p. 14.
Concerns were not all demanding, however, as the Crimean 
iter was fought without significant disruptions in Britain's 
■‘COWnercial. activities. Most of Cardwell's attention was 
directed toward difficulties at home concerning the British 
railroad system. At this time the British railways were in
it highly chaotic state of affairs as they had developed
haphazardly over the years without governmental supervision. 
For the sake of public convenience, Cardwell proposed 
legislation for the purpose of standardizing and systema­
tizing the various railway lines. His proposed legislation, 
however, did not squarely face the question of whether the 
fail roads were public or private affairs, and it left 
failroad regulation strictly in the hands of private
18enterprise. Consequently, his efforts were unsuccessful.
While Cardwell failed to meet the needs of internal 
trade in dealing with the railway system, he had more
success in regulating coastal and foreign shipping. His
19.J&effchant Shipping Bill of 1854, codified existing laws 
relating to shipping, added important amendments and
~^Ibid., pp. 15-16.
19For a discussion of the Merchant Shipping Bill 
and its amendments, see Erickson, pp. 16-19.
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which to this day, forms the basic foundation
20the code of the British Merchant Marine.
In January 1855, Lord Aberdeen's Government gave way 
subsequent Ministry by Lord Palmerston, but Cardwell 
iWfcinued to remain at the Board of Trade. On the discovery, 
jfeifttever, that Palmerston intended to give in to a demand for 
$H' inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean War, a demand 
t&tch Lord Aberdeen had refused, Cardwell, along with 
ffeftiite-s Sir James Graham, Sidney Herbert, and William E. 
Httdstone, resigned. After his resignation, Palmerston 
%tieapted to retain Cardwell's services by offering him 
post of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Cardwell was
fluttered, but out of loyalty to his friends he refused
' 21 Im  offer.
During his next few years in Parliament, Cardwell
1P#ted as an independent liberal-conservative, but gradually
22fttvitated toward the Liberal Party. Late in 1856,
!#W0ver, he voted against Lord Palmerston's Ministry on - 
& Censure resolution pertaining to the Chinese War. The
20
D. N. B., III, 952.
21Biddulph, p. 16; Erickson, pp. 19-20.
22D. N. B., Ill, 952.
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4; §&§#®&ge of this resolution brought about Palmerston's
'■'* JMtal Ignition, and on the appeal to the country which followed,
v. ■
,’^ C ^ e l l  lost his Oxford seat in the House of Commons in the
■ fpiSPlftg elections of 1857. Charles Neate, the successful
however, was unseated by petition for violating
Corrupt Practices Act, and in a new election Cardwell
returned to Parliament by a majority of fifty-three votes
23his opponent, William Thackery.
1 Despite the vote of confidence which Palmerston
iftceived in the elections of 1857, he remained as Prime
isfcer hardly a year when the Orsini assassination attempt
the life of the French Emperor Napoleon III brought
his downfall.: As a result, Lord Derby formed a
:ely Conservative Ministry in 1858, but the wily
24
f^ lfflerston was back in office the following year. In
Palmerston Cabinet Cardwell was chosen to become
for Ireland. At this post he continued to demon-
25#|;rate his usual patience and industry, but despite his
■iW
t-
intentions, Cardwell's efforts had little effect on
^D. N. B_. , III, 953; Erickson, pp. 21-22.
24Erickson, pp. 23-25. 25D. N. B..-IXI, 953.
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*$t»iand's -economic plight. As a result, he was quite 
'^congenial in this position.
In July 1861, ill-health forced Sidney Herbert to
i
v.IAfign from the Palmerston Ministry as Secretary of War.
the Cabinet re-shuffling which followed, Cardwell
the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a Cabinet
2 7position without portfolio. Cardwell could hardly regard 
.vtMs change as a promotion, but the Ministry utilized this 
ftftnial office to engage his advice and counsel for all 
Ipovernment departments. In this respect Cardwell was of 
Special aid to Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
he provided him with assistance on financial, banking,
j- ' 28currency questions.
Cardwell remained as Chancellor of the Duchy of 
&s*ncaster from July 1861, to April 1864, when he became
Oo-lonial Secretary upon the resignation of the Duke of
29 •Sfitfwcastle. As Colonial Secretary, he played an important
For details of Cardwell's performance as Secretary 
Ireland, see Erickson, pp. 26-32.
^Erickson, p. 32; D. N. _B. , III, 953.
^Erickson, p. 32.
2 9Ibid. For a detailed account of Cardwell's 
Activities in the Colonial Office, see Erickson, pp. 32-66.
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VOlft in the development of a policy which his predecessor
) . . 30initiated shortly before his resignation. At a
'tiw when a large proportion of the British Army was servinq
14 the colonies, Cardwell carried out Newcastle's principle
,#f Withdrawing Imperial troops which the Colonies would
financially support during peace time. This policy not
4&Iy relieved the British taxpayer of an expense, but it
promoted the development of Britain's modern system
* 31colonial self-government and self-defense. Later, it
have an important bearing on Cardwell's subsequent work
44 Army reformer.
Upon the death of Lord Palmerston in .1865, Cardwell
trained at the Colonial office until Palmerston's successor,
33
Russell, resigned on June 27 of the following year. 
I&tssell's resignation came on the question of reforming the 
iamentary franchise, something which Russell had long
3QHansard's, CXCIV, 1116.
31D. N. JB., III, 953; Wheeler, pp. 186-187.
32
See below, pp. 38-39.
33Biddulph, p. 16; Erickson, p. 16.
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'-retired.34 Exhausted from his labors at the Colonial
* v'"'''
-riiif4c«, Cardwell departed for an extended vacation in 
, 35
Hi,"'/ ■
* * ,„ Upon his return, Cardwell found the Conservative
* ISbfby Government vitally taken up with the question of
% ,plfliaraentary Reform. When the Derby Ministry came to
*&> ;
l.W ' ■ . “
; fol lowing Russell's resignation, few thought it
^i^ald'have any chance to pass a reform bill. Derby's
■
^■MPOrity Government was looked upon as an interim,
:■ the Liberals could re-form their party lines,
, Itlurn to power, and pass a franchise bill. Mainly 
. |h*ough ■ the efforts of Benjamin Disraeli, Chancellor* i
..«* Exchequer and Conservative leader in the House of
, this did not occur as he successfully managed
36Reform Bill of 1867.
Elie Hal^Vy and R. B. McCallum, Victorian Years, 
1841-1895 f Vol. IV of Hal^vy's A History of the English 
jjNooie in the Nineteenth Century, Translated by E. I. 
fetkin (6 vols.; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), 441. 
t$frr«after cited as Hal^vy.
35 . _Erickson, p. 66.
^"The Bill As It Is, " Blackwood1s Edinburgh 
ffigazfne, CII (August., 1867), 253.
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In February 1868, Disraeli replaced the ailing Derby 
37as Prime Minister, a position Disraeli would hold less
than a year. Although Disraeli had successfully manipulated
the reform of the Parliamentary franchise, the popularity
of his Ministry waned as he absorbed- defeats in April and
May of 1868, on Gladstone’s resolutions proposing the
38disestablishment of the Irish Church. Unable to sustain
such defeats, Disraeli announced that Parliament would be
dissolved that autumn so general elections could take place
39under the franchise created by the Reform Bill of 1867.
Both parties waged vigorous campaigns, but on November 23,
1868, the Liberal Party overwhelmed the Conservatives at 
40the polls. With the Liberal victory, Gladstone was
summoned by Queen Victoria.on December 1 to become Britain’s
41
new Prime Minister.
Many assumed that in the new Liberal Ministry Cardwell 
would become Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he had been
■^John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone 
(New York: The Macmillian Company, 1903), II, 244. Here­
after cited as Morley.
38 x 39
Ha levy., IV, 444. Erickson, p. 66.
40Morley, II, 2 51. 41Ibid., p. 2 52
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42offered the post in the past. Instead, on December 4 
Cardwell received Gladstone's invitation to become head of 
the War Office. Three days later on December 7 an official 
announcement was made of. Cardwell's decision to accept the
4- 43appointment.
As 'Cardwell assumed the office of Secretary of War,
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine lamented, "It is impossible
44not to be sorry for Mr. Cardwell." He ". . . reigns,
the supreme head over the most expensive, and we may
venture to add, by far the most inefficient military
45establishment on the face of the earth." Such remorse 
was unnecessary for Cardwell was not unaware of the 
difficult tasks which lay ahead. During the Crimean War, 
while serving as President of the Board of Trade, and then
^Erickson, p. 67.
^Biddulph, p. 1. 
f 44 "How Is The Country Governed?" Blackwood's Edinburgh 
Magazine, CX (September, 1871), 394.
45Ibid., p. 393. Such a charge was not too difficult 
to substantiate as the British Army was only one-sixth the 
size of the French Army, but yet the expenditures for. both 
were almost equal. In comparison with the Prussian Army, 
the British Army was only one-twelfth the size, yet military 
expenditures were double. J. E. Cairnes, "Our Defences:
A National or a Standing Army," Fortnightly Review, IX 
(February 1, 1871), 170.
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later, and more directly, as Colonial Secretary, Cardwell
had gained ample knowledge of the costly inefficient Army
system. He was firmly convinced that the War Department could
be run more efficiently and more economically. As the new
Secretary of War he would have almost six years to prove it.46
Cardwell knew that if ever unity and economy were to
be introduced into the organization and administration of
the military forces, his energy as Secretary of War had to
be dedicated toward achieving three objectives. First of
all, he had to continue the unification of the War Office
begun during the Crimean War. Secondly, he had to effect
a proper division in the administrative duties of the War
Department. Thirdly, he had to lay the foundation for
arranging the military forces of Great Britain into an
47effective system of national defense.
These objectives were by no means a radical departure 
from the past, but Cardwell knew that before these goals 
ever became realities many obstacles had to be overcome.
First, there was the question of finance. Military reforms 
involved great sums of money, and Parliament was not eager
46Erickson, p. 67.
47Biddulph, pp. 2 5-26.
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to appropriate funds for such purposes. Secondly, reform
involved social difficulties, particularly among the upper-
classes. This section of British society was indisposed
to severing ancient connections, especially when Army reform
involved land owners and the nation's institutions. In
addition, Army officers were looked upon to provide color
and gaiety at social functions; the upper-classes did not
49wish to see this dimmed by Army reform. Thirdly, neither 
the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party was inclined 
toward reform but both for different reasons. The Conserva­
tives were the natural ally of the wealthy upper-classes, 
who for social reasons, wished to maintain the status quo 
for the Army. The Liberals, on the other hand, were economy
minded for financial reasons and not above reducing reform 
50budgets. Lastly, Army reform faced serious constitutional 
difficulties for traditionally the control of the Army 
rested in the hands of the Crown. Reform measures, emanating 
from the Secretary of War, would only weaken the authority 
and influence that the control of the Army gave to the Crown.
Erickson, p. 69; Wheeler, p. 187. 
^Erickson, pp. 69-70. ^ Ibid. , p. 70.
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Naturally, neither Queen Victoria, nor her cousin the Duke
of Cambridge, the Commander-in-Chief, nor the bulk of the
Army officers, would look with favor upon weakening the
51
military prerogative of the Crown.
Early in December 1868, shortly after his appointment,
Cardwell began preparing a memorandum on the whole question
52of Army reform for presentation to the Cabinet. As recent
events in Europe had already brought the question into
focus, Cardwell felt the new Liberal Ministry would soon
be forced to deal with the matter. In this memorandum,
which Cardwell presented to the Cabinet early in January 
531869, he accurately forecast that before anything could
be done about general Army reform the Secretary of War
had to be acknowledged the final authority on all military 
54
matters. Cardwell explained to the Cabinet that theo­
retically the Commander-in-Chief was subordinate to the 
Secretary of War, but in reality both offices held dual
control over the military establishment as neither office
55
was independent, nor subordinate to the other. Even though
51
-^Erickson, p. 70. 
~^Ibid. , p. vii.
Ibid.
57Biddulph, p. v. 
^^Biddulph, p. v.
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the Duke of Cambridge, as Commander-in-Chief, had tacitly
submitted to the Secretary of War as his superior, Cardwell
56stated that this would not do as an official arrangement.
As Cardwell attempted to deal with this problem of 
Army administration he encountered much opposition for 
two schools of thought existed on the matter of military 
control. The first was the "professional" school, and it 
maintained that any individual who administered the affairs
of the Army had to possess a distinguished record in the
. . . 5 7military service. Cardwell, however, was not of like mind
as he was never a member of the military service, a fate for
which the Quarterly Review soundly condemned him as not having
5 8a single qualification for heading the War Office. Instead, 
Cardwell chose to belong to the "constitutional" school of 
thought which held the view that the Army was under the 
control of Parliament and its representative. Since Cardwell 
based the authority of his office on this principle, it was 
only natural that his initial efforts at ending dual control
56 57Erickson, p. 70. Ibid., p. 67.
58 "Inefficiency of the British Army," Quarterly 
Review, CXXIX (July-October, 1870), 509. Hereafter cited
as "Inefficiency of the British Army."
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would be met with severe opposition from Army officers and
59their friends, both m  and out of Parliament.
Before Cardwell could gain much momentum toward
ending dual control in the military establishment, he
had to direct his energies toward the preparation of the
Army Estimates for the coming year. As Secretary of War
Cardwell knew that he was expected by the Ministry to cut
military expenditures without weakening the nation's
60defenses at home or abroad. He did not consider such a
task impossible for on January 9, 1869, in a letter to
Gladstone, Cardwell proposed an arrangement whereby an
efficient defensive force could be maintained at a greatly
reduced cost. He informed Gladstone that he was prepared
to reduce the colonial forces from 50,000 to 2 6,000, place
the discipline of the Militia under the War Office and train
it with the Army, and eliminate the inefficient corps within
the Volunteers and combine its training with the Militia and 
61the Army.
The first of these changes, the reduction of colonial 
forces, was the most important as Cardwell considered this
^Ericks on, p. 67. 
•^^ Ibid. , p. 26.
^Biddulph, p. 25.
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policy to be a progressive step toward general Army reform.
This proposed action was merely a continuation of the
principle of colonial self-reliance which had its development
62during his tenure as Colonial Secretary. By reducing the 
colonial forces Cardwell hoped that in the future it would 
not be as difficult to encourage enlistments as it had in 
the past. With increased enlistments the period of foreign 
service could eventually be reduced and a balance struck 
between home service and service abroad. Cardwell hoped 
that this would pave the way to a shorter enlistment period, 
something which he considered essential for a healthy Army
■ 4-- 63organization.
On March 11, 1869, Cardwell presented his much-' 
awaited Army Estimates to the House of Commons for the 
coming fiscal year— April 1, 1869, to March 31, 1870.^
He announced the net expenditure for the Army services at 
£12,047,600 which compared to £13,331,000 for the previous
62See above, pp. 2 9-30.
^Biddulph, pp. 26-27.
64Hansard1s, CXCIV, 1111. For an itemized account
of expenditures see, B_. S_. P., "Army Estimates of Effective 
and Non-Effective Services for 1869-70," XXXVI (1868-1869), 
2- 201.
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65year, a reduction of £1,283,400. This retrenchment was
made possible during Cardwell's first year in office by
his policy of withdrawing troops from the colonies which,
in turn, activated further reductions in the purchase of
military supplies.bb By reducing the number of troops in
the colonial stations Cardwell was able, not only to reduce
military expenditures, but also to increase the estimate of
troops for home defense in the coming year to 92,015 men, as
67compared with 87,505 for the previous year.
To many individuals it looked as if Cardwell was
strengthening home defenses at the expense of the colonies,
but he argued the latter would not be weakened. On the
contrary, his policy would strengthen the colonies for it
would force them to rely more on their own resources.^
Furthermore, the colonies had no need of fear for as Cardwell
stated, ". . . they live under the aegis of . . . England,
69and . . . war with them is war with England.
During Cardwell's long speech on the Estimates, he 
outlined to the House of Commons what his future intentions
65Hansard's, CXCIV, 1111. 66Erickson, p. 72.
67Hansard's, CXCIV, 1114. 68Ibid., p. 1117.
69Ibid.
were for the Army. He felt that Great Britain, protected
by her insular location and large.Navy, needed only a
small but efficient peace-time Army, yet one capable of
easy expansion. This Army needed to be provisioned with
materiel of the highest quality, but he cautioned that
supplies should never be allowed to accumulate to such
large proportions that wear or obsolescence became a 
70danger. Furthermore, he stated that necessity demanded
stronger relations be developed and. maintained between the
Regular Army and the auxiliary forces in order to derive
71the maximum advantage from their combined strength.
Cardwell concluded by stating that the Army Estimates were
founded on the ". . . determination that nothing should be
allowed to injure the efficiency of the service, or the
72interests of the country.”
At the .conclusion of his address, Cardwell received
warm praise from both sides of the aisle, not only for
showing a considerable reduction in the Estimates, but also
7
for conjecturing future improvements in the military system.
7QIbid., p. 1123. 71Ibid., pp. 1124-1129.
72Ibid., p. 1139.
73Ibid., pp. 1140, 1151, 1157, 1162, 1165.
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Strangely enough/ Cardwell made only slight reference to
the fact that the relationship between the War Office and
the Horse Guards was under review, and made no mention of
needed administrative reforms at the War Office.^ As a
result, the professional soldiers were somewhat relieved
at what they considered to be a mild program of Army reform;
nevertheless, they remained apprehensive as to what Cardwell
7 5might do next. They would not have long to wait.
^ Ibid. , p. 1139. 7 SDErickson, p. 73.
CHAPTER III
WAR OFFICE REORGANIZATION
Upon accepting the seals of the War Office, Cardwell 
stipulated that Lord Northbrook be appointed his Under­
secretary of State for War.^ Cardwell's preference for 
this important position was a man who possessed excellent 
credentials as an administrator. Prior to his elevation to 
the House of Lords, Northbrook served in the House of Commons 
for ten years, holding appointments as Lord of the Admiralty,
Under-Secretary of State for War, for India, and for the 
2
Home Office. A man of Northbrook's ability and experience
might well have sought higher office, but he chose to accept
Cardwell's invitation to become his Under-Secretary. . As it
turned out, the office proved to be more important, and the
3work more arduous, than many other offices of higher rank.
Capitalizing on the thoroughness and energy with 
which Northbrook discharged his administrative duties,
^Bernard Mallet, Thomas George: Earl Of Northbrook 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908), p. 48. Hereafter 
cited as Mallet.
9 3Erickson, p. 70. Mallet, p. 48.
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Cardwell appointed him chairman of a small committee to
inquire into the existing arrangements for conducting the
business of the Army departments, including the Horse 
4Guards. Northbrook's Committee, as it was known, conducted 
a thorough investigation, and its conclusions were presented 
to Parliament in three successive reports— -one in March 1869, 
a second in May of the same year, and a third in February 
1870.5
The first of these reports' was submitted to Parliament 
on March 11, 1869, the same day that Cardwell presented his 
Army Estimates for the fiscal year 1869-1870. In this 
report the Northbrook Committee analyzed the supervision 
of expenditures incurred by the various administrative 
departments within the War Office. It discovered that the 
Army departments functioned under the traditional theory 
of financial control, whereby they were constantly checked 
watched, and distrusted. Thus, two antagonistic powers
4Ibid. ,
5S. S. P., "Report of the Committee appointed to 
Inquire into the Arrangements in Force for the Conduct 
o f  Business in the Arwy , ” X2I (1870) r. 3-24- addition
to Northbrook, tbe following? individaals vgie also on ubs 
c o m it t e e z  J. 5 tansf eldf W- 5- Anderson/ and Edward Eti^aurd.
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existed within the War Office as the various departments
sought to increase expenditure, while administrative policy
sought to check expenditure. Efficiency and economy were
6thus m  conflict. The Northbrook Committee recommended
that a better system of management lay in the harmonization 
\
of finance and administration through the Secretary of War.
Rather than maintaining a critical division of War Office
administration, the Northbrook Committee suggested that
the Secretary of War, since he was responsible for both
finance and administration, could attend to financial
considerations on administrative policy from its inception.
Thereby, he could prevent financial matters from hindering
administrative policy during the development of the latter
7during each fiscal year.
Since it was impossible for the Secretary of War to 
observe all the demands of financial expenditure, the 
Northbrook Committee advised that a subordinate Parliamentary 
officer be created to assist him ". . . in the success of
O
the whole administration of the Army . . . ." Termed the
^Ibid., p. 3.
8Ibid.
Abid.
Financial Secretary, this officer, using the existing 
Accountant-General's Department as his staff, could
supervise the compilation of the Army Estimates which
. . . 9
originated m  the various administrative departments. By
imposing on the department heads the responsibility of 
constructing the Estimates in accordance with the financial 
and administrative policies of the government as set forth 
by the Secretary of War, efficiency and economy could more 
easily be introduced into the overall administration of
4.-U a  10the Army.
Ironically, the newly recommended policy of harmonizing 
finance with administration was anticipated by Cardwell.
During the preparation of the Army Estimates for 1869-1870, 
he had instructed the various department heads in the 
responsibility of constructing Army expenditures in accordance 
with administrative policy. As a result, Cardwell was able 
to reduce the Army Estimates for the coming fiscal year by 
a considerable amount; therefore, in the conclusion of its 
first report, the Northbrook Committee commended Cardwell 
for having previously adopted a policy which made this 
reduction possible."^
9Ibid. , p. 4. ^ Ibid.
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On May 7, 1869, two months after submitting its first
report, the Northbrook Committee presented a second in which.
it reviewed administrative policy on the question of Army
12transport and supply. Two years earlier, in 1867, a
committee presided over by Lord Strathnairn, recommended the
fusion of the departments of Supply, Transport, Commissariat,
13Stores, Purveyors, and Barracks under a Controller-in-Chief. 
Sir John Pakington, then Secretary of War, accepted the 
recommendation of the Strathnairn Committee and appointed
Sir Henry Storks as head of the newly created Control
. 14Department by placing him■in charge of the reorganization.
While Pakington carried out the main recommendation of the
Strathnairn Committee, the Northbrook Committee pointed out
that he did not adopt its proposal to create a separate
Ordnance Department. With the understanding that Pakington
15had left this suggestion for future consideration, the 
Northbrook Committee recommended that the provision, custody,
~^Ibid. , p. 6.
~^Ibid., "Copy of Correspondence between the Treasury 
and the War Office respecting the formation of the Department 
of Control," XLII (1867-1868), 877.
^ Ibid. Sir Henry Storks remained as Controller-in- 
Chief under Edward Cardwell, Pakington's successor.
15Ibid. , XII (.1870), 6.
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and issuance of war munitions continue to remain part of the
Control- Department. In regard to this question the Northbrook
Committee felt that unity of administration greatly outweighed
any advantages which might be derived from the creation of
16separate departments.
After submitting its second report Lord Northbrook's
Committee immediately proceeded to its third task which
involved an investigation of the administration of the War
Office and the Horse Guards. In pursuit of this inquiry it
took a considerable amount of evidence, and its third report,
which led to important results, was not presented to Parliament
17until February 12, 1870. In the report the Northbrook
Committee pointed out that dual control existed:
. . . between the War Office and the Horse Guards,
i/and7r the habit is still to prefer a system of 
unnecessary check, double labour, and divided 
responsibility to one of well-defined responsi­
bility, simplicity, and confidence.
Instead of dual control, the Northbrook Committee recommended
that a sound system of Army administration be based on the
16Ibid., p. 7. 
^ Ibid, , p. 10.
^ Ibid. , p. 9.
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following principles: (1) The Secretary of War was the
responsible head of Army administration; therefore, all
Army departments had to be responsible to him; (2) The
Secretary of War, of necessity, dealt with the large
questions of policy and planning; therefore, the daily task
of Army administration had to be conducted by the department
heads under him and their subordinates. In conclusion,
the Northbrook Committee stated that these recommendations
were based on the assumption that arrangements were in
19progress for ending dual.control.
Upon becoming Secretary of War, Cardwell realized 
that until his civilian office was established as the 
supreme, unquestioned authority of Army administration, 
the War Department would continue to remain subject to 
separate staffing, duplication of duties, and departmental 
squabbling. Thus, while the Northbrook Committee was 
preparing and presenting its reports, Cardwell was struggling 
to centralize the administration of the Army under his 
control. These efforts were made extremely difficult by the 
presence of the Duke of Cambridge in the office of the
•^-^Ibid.
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2 0Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. Since becoming
the.Commander-in-Chief in 1857, the Duke had conducted
his command without significant interference from the War
Office;, therefore, he had come to regard his position as
21almost unassailable by 1869. ‘ Not only was the Duke unduly
autocratic and extremely conservative in military matters,
but he was also ". . . imbued with the most rigid opinions
as to the relationship of the Sovereign with the Army . . . .
In addition, he possessed a strong sense of personal dignity
which fortified his conviction that the prestige of the
Commander-in-Chief would be destroyed if his office were
moved to Pall Mall and placed under the direct control of
2 3the Secretary of War.
In the same strain the Queen wrote to Cardwell
admonishing him that " . . .  such a step could not fail to
2 4damage the position of the Commander-in-Chief." Along
2 0 Erickson, p. 73. 2 1 Wheeler, p. 184.
2 2 Ibid. , p. 164. 2 3 0 mond, p. 112 .
2^George Earle Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen 
Victoria (2nd series; New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,
1926), I, 584-585. Hereafter cited as Letters of Queen 
Victoria.
with her cousin the Duke of Cambridge, the Queen simply
did not understand the necessity of reorganizing the
administration of the Army. Her opposition, therefore,
forced Cardwell to postpone any definite action on dual
control until the Northbrook Committee completed its study
25and made its recommendations.
MeanWhile., to avoid Her Majesty's displeasure
Cardwell proceeded with great caution. In answer to
questions in the House of Commons he denied that dual
26control existed either in theory or principle, and 
defended this position by referring to an Order-in- 
Council, issued on October 11, 1861, which restricted the
2Commander-in-Chief to the authority of the Secretary of War. 
Cardwell, however, was aware that communications between his 
office and the Horse Guards were conducted by official 
correspondence just like any two other government offices.
2 5Erickson, p. 73.
2 6Hansard1s, CXCVII, 145.
2 7 B. S. P., XXXVI (1868-69), 591.
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2 8which were entirely independent of each other. As 
Secretary of War, he conducted the civil administration of 
the Army while the Commander-in-Chief exercised direct
o Q
authority over the military forces. Realistically,
however, Cardwell knew that dual control existed but to
openly admit it and advocate its abolition meant an attack
upon the military prerogative of the Crown before he had
30the political support to do so.
After the Northbrook Committee made public its 
recommendation to end dual control, Cardwell's effort to 
abolish the system gained considerable momentum. But 
before Cardwell could take political action, he had to 
maneuver the Duke of Cambridge into attending weekly 
meetings of the War Council which was composed of the 
heads of the various Army departments. When Cardwell 
first suggested such meetings for the purpose of
2 8The drawbacks of such an arrangement were obvious. 
Matters that could be easily settled with the spoken word 
were clumsily drawn out by correspondence. Later that same 
year (1869) Cardwell forbade correspondence between the War 
Office and the Horse Guards and established a common 
registry for the letters of both. This reduced the number 
of letters for that year by thirty-thousand in the War 
Office alone. Biddulph, pp. 54-55.
^ Ibid. , p. 22 6 .
30Erickson, p. 73.
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administrative planning, the Duke agreed with the idea but
refused to attend unless his staff was allowed to accompany
him. The Duke, inclined to be overly concerned with his
prestige as Commander-in-Chief, was worried that his
dignity would .be impaired if his advisers were not present
in the assemblage of Cardwell's staff. Cardwell, however,
denied the Duke's request as he informed His Royal Highness
that he did not need the advice of the Duke's staff, but
31he did need the counsel of his Commander-in-Chief.
Diplomatically, Cardwell wrote to the Duke stating that
he was prepared "'to look to Your Royal. Highness as my
principle military adviser, in a sense, and to a degree,
not yet practiced . . . . ' '  In deterrence to this
cajolery by the Secretary of War the Duke agreed to attend
the War Council, meetings without his staff, and regular
meetings of the War Council were held on a weekly basis
. 33for the first time in British History.
By no means ignorant of Cardwell's intention to 
remove his office from the Horse Guards and place it in the
3 1  , • ,Ibid., p. 75.
"^Cardwell Papers 30/48/3-13: 208. Cardwell to the 
Duke of Cambridge, April 12, 1870, as cited by Erickson, p. 75.
^Erickson, p. 75.
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War Department at Pall Mall, the Duke of Cambridge fully 
realized that his position as Commander-in-Chief was 
gradually becoming more and more subordinate to the 
authority of the Secretary of War. In an effort to fore­
stall his inevitable removal to the War Office, the Duke 
compromisingly suggested that he go to Pall Mall whenever
the Secretary of War wished to see him. Cardwell, however,
34refused to grant such a concession.
In the meantime Cardwell prepared a draft of an
Order-in-Co'uncil which clearly defined the duties of the
Commander-in-Chief as subordinate to the Secretary of War
and limited the Duke's successors to a five year tenure.
Cardwell sent this document to .the Duke who reluctantly
approved it after the Secretary of War agreed to extend
the command of His Royal Highness over the British military
3 5forces in Canada and Ireland. Fearing a threat to her
Royal military prerogative, the Queen did not wish to
3 6sign the Order, but did so on June 4, 1870, on the
37
formal request of her Prime Minister. With Her Majesty's
34 35Wheeler, p. 196. Erickson, p. 75.
3 6 B. S. P., XLII (1870), 683.
^Morley, II, 360-361.
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signature the office of the Commander-in-Chief became what 
Cardwell intended it to be, a departmental office under
3 0
the direction of the Secretary of War. Although the 
Commander-in-Chief and his staff were not removed from
•3 q
the Horse Guards to Pall Mall until 1871, the Duke was
given a temporary room at the War Office where he lamentingly
wrote his letters under the address, "Horse Guards, Pall 
40
Mall."
In spite of the removal of the Commander-in-Chief 
from the Horse Guards to the War Office, Cardwell knew this 
would not end the confusion and inefficiency which resulted 
from administrative mismanagement. Hence, he was still 
faced with the task of evolving a workable administrative 
arrangement at the War Office. It appeared to the Secretary 
of War that the best solution to the problem was to make a 
statutory distribution of administrative duties in the War 
Department.^  Fortunately, along with recommending the
^Erickson, p. 75.
39Biddulph points out that some individuals had 
suggested the move should not have taken place until a 
new War Office building was constructed. Such a sine die 
postponement would have been unwise for a new War Office 
building was not completed until 19U3. Biddulph, p. 142.
40Omond, p. 114. ^Biddulph, p. 238.
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abolition of dual control, the Northbrook Committee outlined
such a distribution in its third report. It recommended
that the business of the Army be conducted by three large
departments: the Military, the Control, and the Financial.
In addition, it recommended that Army administration be given
more representation in Parliament as the Army was limited to
the Secretary of War and his Under-Secretary. The Royal
Navy, on the other hand, was represented by four officials
plus all the members of the Board of Admiralty. The
Northbrook Committee suggested, therefore, that the heads
of the Control and Financial Departments be made eligible
to assist the Secretary of War in representing the Army in'
42Parliament.
Acting on these recommendations in. extenso, Cardwell
43secured the passage of the War Office Act in April 1870.
This act divided the administration of the Army into three
huge departments, the heads of which became eligible to
44represent the Army in Parliament. Under the provisions 
4 2 B. S.'P., XII (1870), 10-11.
42For the complete bill, see B. S.. P., IV (1870),
779-780.
44Biddulph, p. 54.
of this act, the Military Department was placed under the
Commander-in-Chief who became the Secretary of War's chief
45
military adviser. In addition to the Regular Army, the
Commander-in-Chief was given charge over the auxiliary force
as well as the following branch departments: Military
Education, Chaplain's, Medical, and Topographical, of which
the latter ultimately became the Intelligence Department.^
The second division of Army administration was the Control
Department. Its head, the Controller-in-Chief, newly named
47the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, was charged with all 
matters concerning supply, transport, clothing, and war 
munitions. The third department, the Financial branch was
4 5 B . S. P., XII (1870), 11.
^Biddulph, p. 54. Cardwell established the Intelli 
gence Department in 187 3. The function of this department 
was to prepare information regarding fortifications, equip­
ment, means of supply and transport, numbers of all military 
units in every part of the country, and anything else which 
might be desired by the Secretary of War or the Commander- 
in-Chief. Since the department was patterned after the 
logistics branch of Prussian military science, the Intelli­
gence Department in no way carried out the functions which 
are generally associated with the Army Intelligence of the 
present day. Hansard1s, CCXIV, 871-87 3.
4 7 Tbj_d, , p. 52. Sir Henry Storks was elected M. P. 
in 1870 and continued as the head of this department until 
the end of Gladstone's first Ministry in 1874.
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placed under a Financial Secretary who became responsible 
to the Secretary of War for preparing the Army Estimates.
In addition, he was charged with the appropriation, accounting,
and audit of all funds which Parliament made available to the
48 . . .
Army. In conjunction with the three major divisions of Army
administration there was also a fourth, but it remained out­
side the three main branches and dealt with matters which 
did not pertain to any of the other three. This minor branch
was called the Central Department and was headed by the
49
Under-Secretary.
To complete the fusion of all military and adminis­
trative departments under the Secretary of War Cardwell felt 
yet another change was necessary. In a memorandum to the 
Queen in January 1871, Cardwell suggested that the Military 
Secretary be appointed by the Secretary of War so that 
matters of discipline and appointments in the military
forces could be submitted to the Secretary of War by a
50public official. Up until this time the' Military Secretary
48 • •Ibid., p. 54. Cardwell appointed J. C. Vivian
as Financial Secretary in 1869. He was followed in 1871
by Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Wheeler, pp. 193-194.
^Wheeler, pp. 190-191.
50Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 113.
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had been a member of the personal staff of the Commander-in-
51Chief and chosen by him. The Queen was reluctant to
change such an arrangement as she was fearful that in
matters relating to discipline and appointments the Secretary
of War would consult the Military Secretary instead of the
Commander-in-Chief. She felt this would place the Duke
52
. . m  a very anomalous position . . . ." In order to
remove her apprehensions Cardwell informed the Queen that
the Military Secretary would continue to remain an officer
of high rank, subject to approval by Her Majesty and
subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, he added
that without her approval on this matter Parliament would:
. . . not consent to vest in the Commander-in-
Chief the extensive power of selection, which
is necessary both for the abolition of purchase,
and also for the union of the Reserve Forces
53with the Regulars.
In spite of this appeal,' the Queen remained immovable in her 
position. Finally, Cardwell agreed to a compromise and 
allowed the Commander-in-Chief to select the Military 
Secretary, but he remained insistent that the appointment
51
Erickson, p. 76.
52Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 115.
~^Ibid., p. 116.
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54be confirmed by the Secretary of War. With the assurance
that this proposed arrangement would in no way alter the
position of the Commander-in-Chief on military matters
concerning discipline and appointments, the Queen gave
5 5her consent to Cardwell's arrangement.
With the fulfillment of this compromise, Cardwell
completed his plan for reorganizing the administration of
the Army under the control of the Secretary of War. Unlike
his predecessors at the War Office, Cardwell did not attempt
to build an efficient military department on the confusion
of administrative offices; instead, he sought to remedy the
confusion before he attempted to develop an efficient Army 
56organization. It was on this premise that he secured 
both the abolition of dual control and the passage of the 
War Office Act. Thereby, the Secretary of War was made 
responsible to Parliament for all the administrative depart­
ments of the Army whose duties were now clearly defined.
Having "put his house in order," Cardwell began to 
turn his attention toward developing a plan to abolish the
^Omond, pp. 116-117.
5 5Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 118.
56Biddulph, p. vi.
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centuries old practice of purchasing military commissions 
in the British Army. Cardwell did not know it, but he was 
facing his most difficult test as an Army reformer.
CHAPTER IV 
THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE
The system of purchasing military commissions had
long attracted much public attention as over the years it
had been repeatedly investigated by Royal Commissions,
heatedly debated in Parliament, and voluminously discussed
in phamphlets and newspapers.'*' In the House of Commons
annual motions called for its abolition but without success.
As Secretary of War, Sidney Herbert once entertained the
idea of seeking its abolition but dropped the matter when
2he encountered strong opposition from many quarters. In
spite of this renewed agitation .for the abolition of the
purchase system, the issue did not gain much momentum until
3the advent of Gladstone's first Ministry, which coincided
^"Purchase in the Army," Quarterly Review, CXXIV 
(January-April, 1868), 525. Hereafter cited as "Purchase 
in the Army."
2
Omond, p. 121.
3
Justin McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times (New 
York: United States Book Company, 1894), IV, 566. Hereafter 
cited as McCarthy.
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with the dramatic achievements of Prussia's military system 
on the continent.
Witnessing the military might of Prussia, exemplified 
first in 1866, and then 1870, Edward Cardwell realized that 
if Great Britain were to defend herself against the possible 
threat of Prussian militarism, it would be necessary to 
amalgamate the auxiliary forces with the Regular Army in
order to create a more harmonious and compact fighting
4
machine. This task imperatively demanded the abolition 
of the purchase system as every question of Army reorgani­
zation was tied to the pecuniary interests of its officers.
As long as purchase existed, an officer in the Regular Army 
could not be transferred to a reserve unit as the auxiliary 
forces were under the leadership.of non-purchase officers. 
Neither could a purchase officer be forced to take a 
commission of inferior rank in another regiment. Hence, 
Cardwell was denied any direct control of Army reorganization 
as it was impossible to contract or expand Army units from 
one regiment to another without creating new pecuniary 
interests or interferring with those already existing.
4Biddulph, pp. 98-99.
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Cardwell, therefore, regarded " . . .  the abolition of
purchase, not at the end but at the beginning of any
5system of reorganization of the Army."
The actual origin of the purchase system is a 
debatable issue as some historians point to 1627 when two 
different rates were paid for military commissions, as one 
rate existed for civilians seeking initial commissions and 
another for officers seeking higher rank. Other historians 
point to the Restoration period when non-military positions 
were bought and sold.^ At any rate, it is known that 
Charles II recognized the system by Royal Warrant in 1683; 
ten years later, William III abolished the system by the
7
same means. It was revived again by Queen Anno, and 
subsequently recognized as a legal institution in the
O
Ive vs. Ash decision of 1702. In the years that followed
^Har.sard' s , CCVII, 10 59. 6 Erickscn, p. 77.
7
The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at 
Home and Abroad, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1758- 
), CXIII, Pt. I, 69-70. Hereafter cited as Annual 
Register.
o
R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of 
The Oxford History of England, ed. G. N. Clark (14 vols.; 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 10. Hereafter cited as 
Ensor.
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the purchase system became an accepted institution. During 
the reign of George III, Parliament passed an act forbidding 
the sale of government offices, but the Crown retained the 
right to continue the sale of military commissions.^
In actual practice the purchase system developed out 
of the Crown's prerogative to raise troops for the Army.
As Parliament imposed taxes for this purpose, the Crown 
used these funds to make contracts with certain individuals 
for the purpose of raising a number of soldiers— usually a 
regiment. In return, these individuals were given command 
of the regiment and allowed to nominate their own officers. 
Since the financial terms of these contracts were seldom 
sufficient to raise whole regiments, the regimental com­
manders made sub-contracts with their friends to raise 
companies within the regiment. As the officers of the 
regiment, these sub-contractors acquired rights.of property 
in their commissions as they shouldered the major expense of 
raising the regiment. Later, when they wished to retire, 
they were able to compensate for their expenditures by 
selling their commissions to the highest bidders.^
^Wheeler, p. 201; Morley, II, 361. 
^Erickson, p. 77.
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Through the years the Crown and Parliament refined
the manner of obtaining■commissions until it became stabilized
in the following procedure. Initially, an individual was
required to pass an examination which in essence proved that
he had the education of an aristocratic gentleman.^ After
receiving his first commission, advancement depended upon
seniority so long as the officer had the money to purchase
the next, commission above him. Thus, if a major's commission
were available, the senior captain in the regiment had the
initial opportunity to purchase it. If he did not care to
purchase, or could not, the next senior officer could do so.
Commissions could be purchased through the rank of lieutenant-
12
colonel, but higher ranks were never for sale. These
positions, as well as all commissions vacated by death, were
13filled On the basis of seniority,
Commonly applied the purchase system affected only
A
the Cavalry and Infantry regiments. In the Royal Engineers 
and Royal Artillery officers were required to have some 
technical training, and promotion was based on merit alone.
~^Ibid.; "The Government Army Bill," Quarterly 
Review, CXXX (January-April, 1871), 569.
1 o
^Erickson, p. 77. 1^Wheeler, p. 201.
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Most purchase officers, however, were aristocrats by birth
and training, and they tended to ignore these technical
branches as beneath their dignity as gentlemen.
Although' a price scale for the sale of commissions
15had been established in 1719, and a ceiling for that
16scale had been added by Royal Warrant in 1776, it was
impossible to keep the system within prescribed regulations.
In selling their commissions most officers unlawfully
exceeded the scale limit by seeking whatever price they
could get. The purpose behind these over-regulation
payments was to induce officers into an early retirement,
thereby providing ambitious junior officers with more rapid
17means of advancement.
Although the problem of over-regulation prices had
18
been investigated many times in the past, Cardwell 
appointed a new commission on April 5, 1870, to inquire
"^Erickson, p. 77; Woodward, p. 267.
■^Erickson, p. 77; Biddulph, p. 82.
Z- / "Report of the Commissioners appointed 
to Inquire into Over-Regulation Payments on Promotion in 
the Army, 11 XII (1070), 203.
17Ibid.. p. 211. 18Ibid., p. 203.
into the matter. In its report this commission, under the 
chairmanship of Sir George Grey, admitted that it was unable 
to ascertain exactly when the practice of over-regulation 
payments began but assumed that it existed from 1719, when
2 0the regulation of commission prices was first established.
It pointed out that over-regulation payments had been pro­
hibited by Royal Warrant until 1807, when a clause was inserted 
into the Mutiny Act. This clause prohibited the sale of 
commissions by persons who acted as unauthorized Army agents 
negotiating the purchase or sale of commissions. Thereafter,
future changes in the regulation of commission prices were
> . ■ 21 
made under this clause m  the Mutiny Act until February 3,
1866, when regulation prices were again set by Royal 
22
Warrant. But in spite of statutory law and royal Warrants,
the Grey Commission reported that regulation prices were
2 3generally exceeded throughout the Army.
■L9Ibid. , p. 202 . 2 0Ibid. t p # 209.
21 22
Ibid., p. 20 5. Ibid., p. 201.
2 3Ibid., p. 209. Even though the actual over­
regulation prices varied from regiment to regiment the 
following scale of an infantry regiment is a good illus­
tration of over-regulation payments. The reader should 
keep in mind that the officer who sold his commission to 
purchase another paid only the difference in cost between
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The Grey Commission concluded its report by stating
that the practice of paying over-regulation prices was known
to exist by the government, but it was never formally
recognized; official knowledge of its existence was denied,
2 4and regulation prices were hardly, if ever, enforced. In
fact, the Grey Commission found only two cases on record
2 5where attempts were made to enforce regulation prices.
Much of the lack of enforcement was due to the fact that
the purchase of a military commission was handled in private
by an authorized Army agent, and the actual transaction.was
26
never recorded.
Since the purchase system was based, on monetary 
interests, it was open to many forms of abuse. Most 
aristocratic young men who entered the military service 
to become officers had little aptitude for the profession,
the old commission and the new, plus the over-regulation 
price. Ibid., p. 210.
Regulation Over-Regulation Total 
Ensign .E450 - E450
Lieutenant E2 50 E100 E3 50
Captain El,100 E600 El,700
Major El,400 E800 E2,200
Lieutenant-COlOnel £1,300 El,000 £2,300
24Ibid., p. 218. 2 5Ibid., p. 219.
2^Wheeler, p. 202.
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and they possessed little desire to make a study of it. A s . 
Army officers they paid little attention to the technical 
questions of military science and wasted most of their time
entertaining themselves with military reviews and parades.
.• 2 7
Using their wealth to gain prominence and prestige, they
rapidly advanced over junior officers who were unable to
purchase higher rank, even under the .inducement of borrowing
2 8funds at exorbitant rates of interest. This led to great
incongruities in the length of Army service as certain
lieutenants might have served twice as long as some of the 
29
captains. In effect, the purchase system prevented the 
development of a professional standard among Army officers 
as it bestowed security and high rank .upon incompetent
30
officers who were seldom denied the right of purchase.
In spite of all the self-evident weaknesses, the 
system had its vehement defenders. Service opinion was 
almost universally in favor of purchase as the Duke of
^Woodward, p. 2 6 8 .
2 8 B. S.- P. , XII (1870), 213. 2 9 Biddulph, p. 77.
^Wheeler, p. 201. The regimental commander had to
give his approval to the purchase, but since he was also a 
product of the system his approval tended to be only a
formality. Erickson, p. 77.
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Wellington extolled the virtues of the system in an 1833 
31memorandum. Likewise/ in 1841, Lord Melbourne's Commission
praised the purchase system for furthering the promotion
and retirement of officers. Similar military reports which
followed during the next thirty years were likewise con- 
32firmatory. In these military reports most of the defending
arguments centered on the advantages which the purchase
system bestowed on the public. For example, it could not
be denied that under purchase Army officers avoided the
favoritism and interference of strong personalities which
33was inevitable under a system of merit. In addition, the
defenders of the system argued that purchase considerably
lowered the cost of the Army Estimates as only a few
officers retired on full pay after thirty years service,
but the number was limited by a very moderate sum allowed
for the purpose in ; the Estimates. Thus, the sale of an
officer's commission provided him with a retirement pension
34which ordinarily would have been a public expense. The 
defenders of the system argued that by abolishing purchase
3 1 Hansard1s, CCIV, 1952. 3 2 Ensor, p. 1U.
3 3 Erickson, p. 79. 3 4 Biddulph, pp. 93-94.
72
the public would incur a great increase in the Army Estimates,
and it would witness lower-class men who had no connection
with the interests and fortunes of the country becoming high
military officers. As long as Army officers were .men of
property, they would serve the country for less and would
maintain the established order as their stake in society
tended to prevent them from lending support to revolutionary
activities.^
With much of the public indifferent toward the
existence of purchase, Cardwell realized that it would
be extremely difficult to terminate a system which had
deep roots in British society. Such a task would encounter
almost insurmountable opposition from many quarters,
including among others, Parliament, the Army, the Duke of
37
Cambridge, and the Queen. But in spite of the unfavorable
odds, Cardwell decided that an attempt had to be made for
it was futile to think of reorganizing the Army without
3 8the abolition of purchase.
^ Hansard 1 s , CCIV, 1438.
^"Purchase in the Army," CXXIV, 525.
^Erickson, p. 7 9 .
^Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 99.
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Early in 1870, Cardwell began his attack on the
system of purchase by proposing the abolition of the lowest
officer ranks— cornet in the Cavalry and ensign in the 
3 9
Infantry. Cardwell's predecessor at the War Office, Sir 
John Pakington, ''originally initiated the proposal in 1868, 
but left office before he could prepare a plan for pres­
entation to Parliament. As Pakington's successor, Cardwell 
took it upon himself to complete this task by proposing 
that every candidate for a first commission be made a
lieutenant at once, and that the government reimburse the
40
cost of purchasing the commission of lieutenant. This
proposal was met with a dismal reception in the House of
Commons and was rejected on the grounds that no provision
41
was made for over-regulation prices.
Not to be discouraged by his initial defeat, Cardwell 
spent the entire summer and autumn of 1870, preparing a plan 
for the complete abolition of purchase. Taking the advice 
which Lord Grey had given in 1857, Cardwell informed Lord 
Granville, the Foreign Secretary, that he agreed with Grey's
40 .Erickson, p. 80. Biddulph, p. 95.
^Illustrated London News, March 19, 1870, p. 303.
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comment, "’it was better to let the Purchase System alone,
42unless you were prepared to abolish it altogether.'"
Gladstone warned Cardwell to "'go slowly'" with "'this
enormous business,'" but by mid-October the plan was in
final form.^
Parliament and the public had little knowledge of
44
Cardwell's ambitious plan until February 16, 1871, when
he surprised both the Army and the nation by inserting
into the Army Estimates an Army Regulation Bill, of which
45
the main provision was the abolition of purchase. This 
bill provided that Army officers would be compensated by 
the government for their commissions according to the 
market which existed for over-regulation prices on 
January 1, 1 8 7 1 . While the Army Regulation Bill did 
not include an estimate of the probable cost of abolishing 
purchase, the Report of Denham Robinson and Robert Davey,
42Cardwell to Granville, November 1870, Granville 
Papers, 30/29/68:84, as cited by Erickson, p. 80.
4^Glads tone Papers, 34: f. 157-160 (Br. Mus. Add.
Mss., 4119), as cited by Erickson, p. 80.
44
The Times (London), July 21, 1871, p. 9.
45Wheeler, p. 20 3.
4 6 B. S_. P.., "Army Regulation of Forces Act," I (1871),
16.
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which was made public at this same time, stated that if the
maximum number allowed for each rank to retire a year did so,
the total cost would amount to approximately £8 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0
through 1896. Purchase, however, Would not entirely
4.7disappear until 1906-1907=
On February 16, 1871, in his speech introducing the
Army Estimates, Cardwell stated that the sole purpose behind
the Army Regulation Bill was to promote the amalgamation of
48
the Army and the auxiliary forces. The key to the whole
bill was, of course, the abolition of purchase, but the bill
also contained two other major provisions. The first removed
jurisdiction from the lord lieutenants of counties over the
appointment of officers in the auxiliary forces and gave
49this authority to the Crown. Future promotions for officers 
in the auxiliary forces would hereafter be made on the basis 
of merit, but the advice of the lord lieutenant of,the county
47 Ibid., "Report by Messrs. Robinson and Davey on the 
Probable Cost of Abolishing Purchase in the Army," XXXIX 
(1871), 677.
4^The Times (London), July 21, 1871, p. 9.
49' Hansard1S, CCVI, 65. The lords lieutenants of 
counties regained their connection with the auxiliary forces 
In 1907, when Secretary of War Richard B. Haldane estab­
lished the Territorial Force as part of his Army reorgani­
zation scheme. Omond, p. 12 4.
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I
■1would be sought for all first commissions. The second
provision gave power to the Secretary of War to lengthen
or shorten the period of enlistment service in the Regular
Army as he felt necessary under certain conditions from 
51
time to time. In addition to the major provisions of the
bill/ there were many other minor clauses which related 
52
to them.
While the Army Regulation Bill was more than just
the abolition of purchase, this became the sole issue of
53
debate m  the House of Commons. On March 6 , 1871, Colonel
Loyd Lindsay opened discussions on the bill by declaring
that national defense did not justify an expenditure of
£8,000,000 for the extinction of purchase. He argued that
it would destroy the regimental system which had successfully
54
won Britain's wars for two hundred years. Lindsay's 
efforts were supported by a group of extreme military 
critics, dubbed the "Parliamentary Colonels," who led the
5°Biddulph, pp. 111-112. 5 1 Ibid., pp. 110-111.
c 9 53
See Appendix C, pp. 147-148. Ensor, p. 10.
5 ^11lustrated London News, March 11, 1871, p. 230.
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55fight to save the purchase system. They argued the
abolition of purchase would stagnate promotion, introduce 
. . 56favoritism, and destroy 11. . . the Army which our Great
57
Duke has bequeathed us." . Night after night the debates
raged; discussions became heated, arguments were repeated,
58and many amendments were proposed. So much ". . .
wrangle and jangle . . . accompanied every word of every
59
clause . . . "  one member of Parliament was forced to cry
out in disgust, "Here we are, after a fortnight, still
60
discussing one clause." As a result, Sir Roundell Palmer
accused the "Parliamentary Colonels" of ". . . endeavouring
61to baffle the majority by mere consumption of time."
"^Ibid., February 25, 1871, p. 182. This group 
included not only Colonel Lindsay, but Captain Stanley, 
Lord Mahon, Colonel Gilpin, Major Arbuthnot, General 
Herbert, Captain Talbot, and others. Ibid., March 11, 
1871, p. 230.
^ Ibid. , March 11, 1871, p. 230.
^Wheeler-, p. 208.
5 8 Ibid., p. 204.
59Illustrated London News, June 24, 1871, p. 622.
60Hansard1s, CCV, 72.
^ Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 71.
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If, by chance, Cardwell heard Palmer's reference to
a majority favoring the abolition of purchase, no doubt he
wondered where it was hiding. As if the opposition of the
"Parliamentary Colonels" and the Conservatives was not
62serious enough, Cardwell had to face considerable
resistence, from factions within his own party. One group
of Liberals was insistent that the Ballot Bill be placed
first on the Ministry's legislative agenda for the 1871 
6 3
session. Both Gladstone and Cardwell, however, refused 
to accommodate this request as they knew that if the Ballot 
Bill passed first, this faction would desert the government 
when it came time to pass the Army Regulation Bill. In 
addition to this faction, some of Cardwell's fellow Cabinet 
members opposed him as well. Both Robert Lowe, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, and H. C. E. Childers, First Lord of the
6 '
Admiralty, did not like the bill and refused to support it.
^McCarthy, IV, 567.
The Ballot Bill was designed to introduce a system 
of secret voting at the polls. It failed to pass in the 
1871 session, but was passed the following session in 1872.
^Erickson, p. 82.
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With few members of the government giving their full 
support to the Army Regulation Bill, the major burden of 
defending the measure fell squarely on Cardwell's shoulders.^ 
Angered by the vicious attacks which the bill was receiving, 
Cardwell presented an eloquent defense of the measure on 
March 16, 1871. After expressing his concurrence with the 
eulogies that had been given in regard to the heroism and 
gallantry which the British soldiers had displayed in' the 
past under the system of purchase, Cardwell added that there 
was a lesson to be learned from the late Franco-Prussian War. 
He pointed out that much of the Prussian success in France 
was largely due to the professional education and training 
of its officers. Similarly, Great Britain needed the 
abolition of purchase if it was to increase the professional 
efficiency of its officer corp as neither heroism o,r gal­
lantry could compensate for professional training ". . .' in
these days when arms of precision shoot down soldiers at
. „66 immense distances.
In answer to the charge that the abolition of purchase 
would destroy the esprit de corps of the regimental system,
6 6Biddulph, p. 115; Erickson, p. 81.
^Hansard 1 s , CCV, 135-136.
Cardwell bluntly stated that few of the regimental commanders
had actually risen through the ranks of the regiment they
. ' 67
were now commanding. He added that if the regimental
system depended upon purchase then it must be- concluded
that neither the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, nor
the Royal Navy possessed the means for preserving order
and discipline in their branches of service as they were
68not subject to purchase. In his summation Cardwell
openly admitted that the bill was an attack on a class
interest which held a monopoly on commissions, but he
defended the abolition of purchase on the grounds that
it would create a true aristocracy .based on merit and
69professional talent.
In spite of Cardwell's efforts to secure quick
passage of the Army Regulation Bill, it was met in committee
with so many dilatory motions and amendments that by June
it was no nearer passage than it was in March. Due to
70 •". . . unparalleled obstructions . . ." which were
6 7 Ibid., p. 142. 6 8 Ibid.
8 8 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
78Philip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone (New 
York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1934), p. 318. 
Gladstone to Queen Victoria, June 10, 1871. Hereafter
cited as Guedalla.
". . . without precedent in the present generation . . . .,"
Cardwell announced the government was dropping three parts
• • 72of the bill m  an effort to secure its passage. These
included: (1) the proposal to qive the Secretary of War
power to shorten or lengthen the period of enlistment
service, (2 ) the proposal to enact compulsory military
service in the case of emergency, and (3) the proposal to
7 3lend money to counties for building Militia barracks.
These clauses were of little importance to the bill in
comparison with the cardinal principle of the abolition
of purchase, but they did offer the opposition numerous
opportunities for inflicting further delays in its passage.
The abandonment of these three proposals lightened the bill
by half of its original thirty-four clauses and to carry
them all would probably have resulted in defeat for the
74whole measure.
71 . .
Ibid., p. 319. Gladstone to Queen Victoria,
June 14, 1871.
^ Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 72.
^ Hansard 1 s # CCVII, 1545-1546.
^Biddulph, pp. 126-127.
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When the government dropped these proposals in the
second week of June, the Conservative opposition screamed
that the Liberal Ministry had abandoned Army reorganization.
On June 12, 1871, Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative leader
in the House of Commons, protested against the fact that
Cardwell had introduced the Army Regulation Bill as an
attempt to reorganize the Army. As the measure appeared now,
it was stripped of those proposals and nakedly stood before
7 6the House of Commons as an abolition of purchase bill.
Cardwell denied this charge by stating:
. . . the other powers proposed to be conferred
by the Bill, thou 1 useful, are not absolutely
Furthermore, he argued that the reorganization of the Army 
was :
Resistence to the bill continued, but gradually 
enough opposition gave way to secure its passage on
necessary
. . . a matter for the Executive Government, and
as that Executive Government we cannot begin 
organization until purchase has been abolished, 
and until the powers of Lords Lieutenant of
counties have been t r a n s f e r r e d . 7 7
75Hansard1s, CCVI, 1907-1908.
*76Ibid. , p. 1906. 77Ibid., pp. 1922-1923.
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July 3, 1871, by a fifty-eight vote majority. Thus, after
four months of debate the House of Commons finally gave
7 Rits approval to the Army Regulation Bill.
On July 4, 1871, the bill was brought from the
Commons and read for the first time in the House of 
79Lords. Lord Northbrook, Cardwell's Under-Secretary, 
opened the debate on the bill with a clear exposition of
on
the government's policy regarding it. He denied that
the Ministry was without a plan for Army reorganization but
later stated that it had no place in the bill. Like Cardwell,
he held Army reorganization to be a function of the Executive
81Government, not Parliament.
\
At the very outset of the debates in the House of
Lords it was apparent that the peers were in conflict with
the decision of the House of Commons . . by class motives
82on a class issue." Many of the members of the House of 
Lords were heads of families who regarded the purchasing 
of commissions as their own perquisite, and it was not
7 8 Ibid., CCVII, 1073. 7 9 Ibid., p. 1077.
R0Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 72-73. 
8 1 Hansard's, CCVII, 1545. 8 2 Ensor, p. 12.
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j
J
difficult to equate their own interests with that of
o p
the nation.
Rather than overtly denounce the abolition of
purchase the peers decided to outflank the government by
a quick maneuver. On July 13, 1871, the Duke of Richmond,
who led the Lords in opposition to the bill, moved that the
measure be tabled until the government offered a complete
84scheme.for Army reorganization. Four.days later/ on
85July 17 this motion was passed by a vote of 155-130.
Thus, by appearing to demand more information the peers
86cleverly tabled the bill without openly voting it down.
But blocking its passage amounted to nothing more than the
Q n
rejection of the bill.
A month before the House of Lords passed this 
killing motion, Cardwell anticipated a postponement in the 
passage of the bill. He decided that an indefinite 
deferment would considerably delay Army reorganization;
8 3Erich Eyck, Glads tone, trans.' Bernard Miall 
(London: Unwin Brothers Ltd., 1938), p. 209. Hereafter 
cited as Eyck.
8 4 Hansard1s, CCVII, 1577-1581. 8 5 Ibid., 1867.
McCarthy, IV, 568.
The Illustrated London News, July 22, 1871, p. 58.
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therefore, on June 12, 1871, he stated in threatening 
words:
We now have the power . . .  to put an end to 
purchase; but we do not see how /we can obtain/ 
the full compensation and security /for Army officers/ 
. . . without an alteration of the law. ^ 8
Although Cardwell did not reveal it then, the power to
which he referred was the Royal Warrant. He knew that
the purchase system existed on that basis alone, and if
89need be, it could be abolished by the same means.
On July 18, the day after the Lords passed their
killing motion, Cardwell suggested to the Cabinet that the
action of the Lords made the use of the Royal prerogative
90
necessary, and the Cabinet gave its approval. Since 
Gladstone had informed the Queen of the possibility of 
such action three days earlier, she was willing to sign
91the Royal Warrant on the formal request of the Cabinet.
After the Cabinet complied with this request, the Queen
88Hansard 1s, CCVI, 1906.
89McCarthy, IV, 569.
90 Guedalla, p. 32 3. Gladstone to Queen Victoria,
July 18, 1871.
^Morley, II, 363; Wheeler, pp. 205-206.
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signed the Royal Warrant on July 20. On the following 
day this fait accompli was presented to Parliament. 92
Immediately, the government was vehemently denounced 
by the opposition, including The Times (London) which had
, g -3
given the government strong support up until this point.
It was generally agreed that the action was legal, but
94the .point;, m  condemnation was the procedure. After
first seeking the abolition of purchase by an act of
Parliament, the government failed to achieve its purpose
95and it resorted to the Royal prerogative. No clever
argument could acquit the Ministry of this charge of
96inconsistency.
While many a cry of "foul" went up in Parliament,
no vote of confidence was ever called over the sudden and
97shocking use of the Royal Warrant. By the same token, 
however, it cannot be said that the procedure made the
9^The Times (London), July 22, 1871, p. 7.
9 ^ 94
Ibid., July 21, 1871, p. 9. McCarthy, IV, 571-572.
9 5 Ibid., p. 573. 9 6 Eyck, p. 210.
97"The Coup D'Etat," •Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine,
CX (September, 1871), 365.
Q Q
Ministry more popular. ° Perhaps the situation called for
a vote of confidence, but the reason why hone was called
can partially be explained by the course of events. The
day after the government announced the Royal Warrant
abolishing the purchase system, the Duke of Richmond was
forced to move that discussion of the matter be postponed
99in the House of Lords until July 31, 1871. As the patron
of the horse races at Goodwood which took place during the 
fourth week in July, the Duke of Richmond was prevented from 
leading the antagonized feelings of the Lords for some ten 
days. When the peers met on July 31, the outraged emotions 
in both houses of Parliament had subsided, and violent 
action against the government failed to materialize. in
effect, the House of Lords had no choice but to unshelve 
the Army Regulation Bill and pass it for without their 
approval Army officers would be unable to receive the
Q Q
J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foot, Gladstone and 
Liberalism (London: English Universities Press, Ltd., 1952), 
p. 119.
^^The Times (London), July 22, 1871, p. 7.
100The Illustrated London Hews, July 29, 1871, p. 8 6 .
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generous compensations which the bill provided for their 
101 ■commissions. After passing the bill the peers, still
angered by the government's procedure, added a censure
resolution which strongly condemned the. Ministry for
attempting ". . . to depricate and neutralize the inde-
1 07pendent action of the Legislature. 1
On October 30, 1871, the day before the Royal Warrant
10 3abolishing purchase became effective, a new Royal Warrant 
was issued outlining a new system of promotion that was 
based on the dual principles of seniority and merit. The
104lowest officer ranks of cornet and ensign were abolished, 
and initial appointments for lieutenancies were made on the 
basis of competitive physical and mental examinations. 
Thereafter, promotions were based on one of two methods.
The regimental commanders or lieutenant colonels would be 
obtained by selection based on merit, and all vacancies 
below that rank would be filled by qualified senior officers. 
But when an officer reached the rank of major-general,
^^Ensor, p. 10; McCarthy, IV, 570.
1Q2Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 78.
103See Appendix D, p. 149. 1 0 4 Biddulph, p. 141.
89
retired/ or died, the vacancy would be filled on the 
basis of selection. This distinction was designed to 
prevent officers from filling vacancies on the principle 
of seniority by the voluntary acts of the officers them­
selves. Hence, officers could no longer make secret
105
bargains for advancement.
With the abolition of purchase an accomplished 
fact, Cardwell's immediate problem was to put into effect 
the provisions of the Army Regulation Bill which related 
to the government's purchase of officer commissions. This 
task he turned over to a purchase commission which con­
sisted of Edward Lugard, Charles Richard, Earl De La Warr, 
and James Cornelius O'Dowd.l^b Almost immediately, Army 
officers echoed complaints against the commission for 
unfair treatment. Their dispute stemmed from the fact 
that under the Army Regulation Bill each officer who 
decided to sell his commission, yet remain in the Army, 
was given what he would have received for it under the 
purchase system. In the future, however, he would have
10 5Erickson, p. 84.
"^^.The Times (London), October 4, 1871, p. 8 .
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to earn his promotions and forfeit his retirement pay.
On the other hand, an officer who decided to leave the 
Army would receive all the money he had invested in 
commissions, but junior officers would find it more 
profitable to stay in the Army, accept future retirement 
benefits, and forfeit the smaller sums which he had paid 
for commissions. Purchase officers could not understand 
why they had to forfeit any sum at all, and this' was the 
grounds of complaint.
On January 30, 1872, Army officers made their 
complaints public by circulating a petition in the House 
of Commons. Cardwell was irked by this action and made 
note of it to the Duke of Cambridge who in turn sent out 
a circular disapproving of the action of the officers.
This attempt to discredit the dissatisfied officers back­
fired as they now petitioned the Duke. Because of the 
widespread dissatisfaction, the Queen suggested an inquiry 
into the matter. Cardwell, however, felt the purchase com­
mission was doing its task admirably, but he reluctantly
informed the Queen that he would not object to the appointment
108of an inquiry, if it became necessary.
107Biddulph, pp. 144-145. 108Erickson, p. 84.
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In July 187 3, the. House of Lords demanded an inquiry
into the mounting officer complaints. In reference to this
motion the Duke of Cambridge implied that officers had been
dealt with unjustly. Therewith, Cardwell became extremely
annoyed with the Duke for he knew that a few well-chosen
remarks from the Commander-in-Chief could have put a stop
109
to the agitation. Nevertheless, Cardwell agreed
to the appointment of a Royal Commission. After exhaustive 
studies the Royal Commission made its report in June 1874, 
three months after Gladstone's Ministry had left office.
The report stated that the grievances of the officers were 
not traceable to the Army Regulation Bill or to the purchase 
commission but were due to conditions which were sometimes 
inseparable from Army service under the purchase system.HO. 
It admitted there were irregularities in the compensation 
for officers' commissions, but it stated this was natural 
when dealing with an extremely complex s u b j e c t . T h e  
Royal Commission concluded its report by expressing the 
hope that the discontent of the officers would gradually
1 0 9 Ibid. 1 1 0 Biddulph, pp. 145-146.
^-^Ibid. , p. 148.
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dissipate as the government was doing its best to administer 
the purchase of commissions in a fair and proper manner.
Ultimately, this hope was realized. Gradually, the 
Army officers accepted their new circumstances, and even­
tually, the Army became far more attractive as the abolition
of purchase brought forth the development of a professional
113
standard for its officers.
The abolition of purchase was truly a remarkable
achievement for with it the Secretary of War gained full
responsibility for the organization and management of the Army
. 114for the first time m  British History. Undoubtedly, the
abolition of purchase involved the expenditure Of a large sum
of money,- but it was necessary. Without the abolition of
purchase the Army could never have been reorganized into the
115efficient force which the nation needed. Cardwell's accom­
plishment was referred to by Gladstone in these glowing words:
. ... I venture to affirm that no man who ever
held the seals of office since the Secretaryship 
at War was established has done so much for the 
reform and efficiency of the Army . . . .
ll2 Erickson, p. 84. 1 1 3 Biddulph, p. 148.
^Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 81.
^■^Wheeler, p. 209.
^~^^The Times (London), October 30, 1871, p. 3.
CHAPTER V 
REORGANIZING THE MILITARY FORCES
During the period between the Crimean War and
Cardwell's arrival at the War Office/ the structure of
the British military forces can best be described in the
words of an unknown Prussian officer, "Your material is
excellent, but you have no organizat i o n . U n l i k e  the
Regular Army, the auxiliary forces of Great Britain were
not subject to the Commander-in-Chief but were under the
direction of an Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, who
2reported to the Secretary of War. As a result, the 
auxiliary forces which consisted of the Militia, Yeomanry, 
Volunteers, Enrolled Pensioners, and Army Reserves, 
lacked a sense of unity and cohesion with the Regular 
Army. Contributing to this nebulous relationship was 
the fact that during the long years of peace following
Hansard's, CXCVI, 1519.
2 Biddulph, p. 22 6 . The Commander-in-Chief was given 
control of the auxiliary forces with the passage of the War 
Office Act in April 1870. See above, pp. 56-57.
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the Napoleonic Wars the auxiliary forces had quickly
3deteriorated m  size and quality.
Of all the auxiliary forces, competent military
4authorities had the least regard for the Yeomanry. Armed
with antiquated firearms, this reserve cavalry force
numbered 17,000 men in 1868. It was required to drill
six days a year, but the actual drill was about as irregular
5as the target practice.
The Volunteer Force numbered approximately 360,000 
men in 1814, but it practically ceased to exist during the 
long European peace which followed after Waterloo. In 
1859, however, this force was reestablished by a roused 
British populace who feared a French invasion as a result 
of the Orsini plot to assassinate the French Emperor 
Napoleon III. Even though the government provided little
7
guidance and direction for the Volunteers, this force, by
3 4Erickson, p. 85. Biddulph, p. 5.
c:
Erickson, p. 85.
6"Military Forces," CXXXIII, 210.
^"Inefficiency of the British Army," CXXIX, 519-520.
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1868, developed into the nation's third line of defense
g
behind the Regular Army and the Militia.
The backbone of the British auxiliary forces was
the Militia as it served two purposes: first, it provided
trained replacements for deficiencies within the ranks
of the Regular Army; and second, it presented a line of
defense for the home front. These two objectives, however,
were somewhat contradictory as the Militia could hardly
provide adequate home defense with raw recruits if it
continued to supply large numbers of trained men for the 
9
Regular Army. Thus, serious thought was given to solving 
this dilemma by creating the Army's own reserve force.
The first move toward creating a specific reserve 
for the Regular Army came in 1843, when Parliament 
authorized the Crown to enroll a force of 10,000 men who 
were on military pensions. Since Britain lacked a system 
of rural police, the primary objective of this enrollment 
was to create a military unit which could aid civil 
authorities in controlling possible disturbances among 
the populace. As a secondary objective, the Crown was
^Army Book, p. 43. ^Hansard's, CXCVI, 1508-1509.
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given authority to use the services of these men in the 
event of a national war.^
In 1859, Secretary of War Sidney Herbert instituted 
the first real Army Reserve through an act which gave the 
Crown authority to create a force of 20,000 men who had 
at least five years' service in the Regular Army. Later, 
under the Reserve Force Act of 1867, the Reserve of 1859
ft
and the Enrolled Pensioners were established as the Second
Class Reserve. The Reserve Force Act of 1867 also created
a First Class Reserve which was limited to 20,000 men.^
The result of these measures, up to December 1868, was
highly unsatisfactory as there were only 13,068 men in
the Enrolled Pensioners, 2,847 in the Reserve of 1859,
12and 2,033 in the First Class Reserve of 1867.
Barring the way to the formation of an adequate
. . 13Army Reserve was the system of long-term enlistment.
After 182 9, under the peacetime conditions which followed 
Waterloo, servicemen enlisted for a period of twenty-one 
years. In 1847, the length of enlistment was lowered to
^^Army Book, pp. 49-50. ~^Ibid.
1 2 Ibid., p. 50. 1 3 Wheeler, p. 215.
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ten years, but in 1867, it was raised to twelve, and
reengagements for nine years were encouraged to complete
the twenty-one years required for pension. With every
soldier in the Infantry required to serve over half of
their enlistment period abroad, which was usually in
India or the tropics, the men were simply too old and
too exhausted to participate in military exercises once
15they were discharged from the Regular Army. Thus, under
this long-service system it was impossible to establish a
reserve of trained men in ^ the prime of life which could
be used to reinforce the Regular Army in a national 
16emergency.
Shortly after Cardwell became head of the War Office 
in late 1868, he discovered that the Reserve Force Act of 
1867 was failing to supply the necessary reserves which the 
country so desperately needed. Due to the lack of adequate 
pay and the undue proportion of foreign service in the 
Regular Army, very few men joined the Army Reserves, and
~^ Army Book, pp. 53-54. ^Ensor, p. 13.
16"Qn the Limitation of Enlistment and Army Reserves, 
Blackwood 1s .Edinburgh Magazine, CV.I (September, 1869), 2 84.
_L /
its ranks were far from full. 'As a result, on March 11, 
1869, Cardwell announced to the House of Commons that he 
felt it was necessary to reduce the period of foreign 
service in order to establish an adequate Army Reserve.
To facilitate the reduction of enlistment service abroad, 
Cardwell began to withdraw troops from the self-governing 
colonies, to disband colonial regiments created and main­
tained by Imperial Estimates, and to encourage the formation
18of colonial forces for their own defense.
As Secretary of War, Cardwell believed that Great 
Britain needed only a small peacetime Army, but it was 
imperative that her Army Reserves be large in order to
I :
provide the Regular Army with easy expansion on the out­
break of war. Cardwell felt that the creation of a large 
Army Reserve necessitated the establishment of a shorter 
period of enlistment. As he explained to the House of 
Commons on June 10, 1869, this would enable men to become
part of the Army Reserve while they still possessed the
19vigor of youth. Comparatively speaking, he pointed out
"* ^ Biddulph, p. 6 8 . ^See above, pp. 39-40.
•^Hansard 1 s , CXCVI, 1535-1536.
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that France required only a five year enlistment; in Prussia
the enlistment was no longer than three years. In the case
of Prussia, however, Cardwell admitted circumstances were
somewhat different as Prussia utilized conscription to fill
its Army Ranks while Great Britain depended upon attraction
and voluntary enlistment. In addition, he explained that
Prussia had no large Army stationed abroad whereas Britain's
2 0 -Army was spread around the world.
Much discussion was given to the establishment of an
adequate Army Reserve during the 1869 session of Parliament,
but no definite plan was adopted. As a result, Cardwell
prepared a scheme which he presented to Parliament on
March 3, 1870, in the form of an Army Enlistment Bill.
Cardwell explained that the bill' would maintain the period
of enlistment service at twelve years, but the men would
serve not more than six, nor less than three years, in the
Regular Army at the option of the Secretary of War. The
balance of six or nine years would be spent as a civilian
in the Army Reserve with the liability of recall to the
21
Regular Army whenever necessity demanded it. Later/ in
2 0 Ibid., p. 1543.
^^Hansard‘s , CXCIX, 1175-1176.
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May when the bill was being debated, Cardwell informed the 
House that:
The object of the Bill is to have a Reserve 
Force . . . trained in the Army, by the Army,
and for the Army, and constituting in the 
moment of emergency a Reserve upon which the 
Army may rely.22
While the Army Enlistment Bill was before the House 
of Commons, the Franco-Prussian War was in progress on the
t
continent. Many members of Parliament felt Britain was
unprepared for war and had no business adopting a measure
that would promote further military unpreparedness. They
advocated that the bill be dropped and urged the adoption
of universal conscription in order to obtain more men for
the Army. Cardwell, however, could not be convinced that
a definite need for conscription existed, and he refused
23
to drop the bill. Resistance to the bill continued 
through most of the summer of 1870, but in late July the 
House of Commons finally passed the measure? the House of
9 ALords did likewise in early August. With the Queen’s
2 2 Ibid., CCI, 788. 2 3 Erickson, p. 87.
^ Hansard1 s, CC1II, 1516. See Ei. S^. J?. , I (1870), 
83-88, for the complete Army Enlistment Bill.
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Royal assent, Britain possessed a new system of short- 
service based on voluntary enlistment.
The passage of the Army Enlistment Act was an
•A
important milestone in the history of Great Britain as the
Prussian victory over the Austrian sat Sadowa proved that a
soldier of short-term enlistment was fast becoming the
2 5
most formidable of all-Europe. Not only did the act 
provide for the creation cf a large Reserve force of 
60,000 men, but the adoption of short-service established 
a more voluntary system of recruitment. Previously the 
Army establishment held the notion that any man would do 
for the.service, no matter how bad his character, since 
he could be easily kept in line by a system of severe 
discipline. Naturally, the presence of common criminals 
in the ranks of the Army tended to deter many respectable 
men from enlisting. This made it necessary to induce men 
to enlist by giving them a bounty upon joining the service 
ranks. This practice not only encouraged enlistments, but 
it also encouraged desertions and fraudulent reenlistments 
to obtain new bounties. In order to prevent this practice
25Morley, II, 359. 26B. S.. P. , I (1870), 85.
a soldier who was convicted of desertion by court-martial
might be sentenced to a severe flogging and/or to an
indelible marking with the letter D— if guilty of bad
conduct he was marked with the letters BC. Cardwell
realized that the subjection of soldiers to flogging and
marking tended to prevent men of good character from
joining the Army; therefore, in 1869, Cardwell abolished
27
flogging under peacetime conditions, and the following
2 8year he completely abolished marking also. In June 1870,
Cardwell abolished the payment of bounty for enlistments
and compensated soldiers for the abolished bounties by
giving monetary rewards to those who completed two years
2 9of good conduct. Two months later in August 1870, with
the passage of the Army Enlistment Act, Cardwell introduced
a new policy of discharging men of. bad character from 
30Army service.
As a result of Cardwell's efforts to obtain a more 
voluntary system of enlistment, the Army became far more
2 7Flogging was not altogether abolished until 1881. 
Army Book, p . 26, n . 3.
2 8 Biddulph, pp. 208-209. 2 9 B. S. P., XIV (1870), 188.
30Biddulph, p. ix.
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popular than it had ever been before as it was now open to
a new class of men. Twelve months after the introduction
of short-service, the number of recruits totaled 23,000
which was nearly double what it had been during the last
31year (1869) of short-service. In addition, the number
of enlistees who deserted before joining their regiments
32
.dropped from 5,000 in 1859 to 800 in 1872.
Having insured the development of an adequate Army
Reserve through the Army Enlistment Act, Cardwell faced the
problem of organizing the various auxiliary forces In such
a manner that they would all work together with the Regular
Army in a national emergency. In April 1869, he had taken
a vital step in this direction by securing the passage of
a bill which permitted the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry
3 3
to train with the Regular Army. But in spite of this
achievement Cardwell desired something more. He wanted:
. . . to weld and consolidate every branch of
the service— -the Regular Army, the Militia, the 
Volunteers, and the Reserve Forces that they may
■^Arthur, p. 71; Biddulph, pp. 211-212.
^B. S_. _P. , "Report on Recruiting for the Regular 
Army," XVIII (1873), 27.
33Erickson, p. 86.
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be animated by one spirit and directed by one 
purpose, and constitute together the great 
defensive force of our country.34
Consequently, on February 6 , 1871, Cardwell presented to
the House of Commons a bill "For the Better Regulation of
the Regular and Auxiliary Land Forces of the Crown." This
bill called for an increase of 45,000 men in the Militia, and
it also made provision for improving the quality of the
Militia by extending the training period and requiring an
annual drill. In addition, arrangements were made to
organize training camps in a manner which would not hinder
35the flow of men from the Army to the Reserves. Cardwell,
however, was unable to gain the passage of this bill as he
was largely concerned with the abolition of the purchase
36
system during the spring and summer of 1871.
Having abolished the purchase system with the passage
37of the Army Regulation Bill in late July, Cardwell returned 
his attention toward the reorganization of the military 
forces during the autumn of 1871. Using the initial reports
3 4 Hansard1 s_. CXCVI, 1539. 3 5 Erickson, pp. 87-88.
3 ^Wheeler, p. 217. 3^See above, pp. 82-83.
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of General P. L. MacDougall's Commission on Military 
3 8Organization and the memorandum of the Duke of Cambridge
39
on the same subject, Cardwell prepared a scheme for the
localization of the military forces.
On February 22, 1872, Cardwell presented the House
of Commons with his localization scheme for consolidating
the military forces into one harmonious body. He explained
to the members of Parliament that by localization of the
forces he meant:
. . . identification with a locality for the
purposes of recruiting, of training, of 
connecting the Reserves with those who are 
actually under the standards.^
Cardwell believed that this scheme would attract men from
classes who formerly did not wish to join the Army, associate
the Army with family ties and kindred, induce men from the
Militia to join the Army, and destroy the recruiting
. . 41competition between the Army and the Militia.
The essential idea of the localization scheme called 
for the organization of all the Infantry forces into military
3 8 ]3. S. _P. , "Report of the Commissioners on Army 
Organization," XVIII (1873), 1-23.
39 • •Ibid. , "Memorandum of the Commander-m-Chief on
Localization," XXXVII (1872), 385-399.
40 41 ‘ .
Hansard 1s, CCIX, 895. Ibid.
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districts, of which there would be sixty-six in Great
Britain and Ireland. Each territorial district would
contain two battalions of Army Infantry, two Militia
battalions, and a certain quota of Volunteers, Enrolled
42Pensioners, and Army Reserves. A depot center would
be established at the hub of each district where the
supplies and headquarters for the troops of that district
would be located. At this district command headquarters,
the Infantry and Militia battalions would receive their
training, and as a general rule all the recruits for both
forces would be obtained within the confines of the 
43
district. In each of the sixty-six districts one of the
Regular Army battalions would always be stationed abroad
and the other at home. The object of this arrangement
was to have the home battalion supply men and equipment
for the twin battalion serving abroad. In each home district,
therefore, an Army battalion and two Militia battalions
would always be ready for activation on a war-time footing.
This arrangement would greatly facilitate mobilization of
the country's entire military forces and would place them
44
in battle readiness at short notice.
^ Ibid. , p. 896.
44Ibid.. pp. 897-898.
43Ibid.. pp. 896-897.
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Although Cardwell described the localization scheme 
only as it applied to the Infantry, he also had similar 
plans for the Royal Artillery. Like the Infantry the 
nation would be sub-divided into districts, but in this 
instance there would be twelve districts in comparison 
with sixty-six for the Infantry. Each Artillery district 
would contain the Royal Artillery plus the Artillery of the 
Militia, Volunteers, and Army Reserves.^ Later, this 
organization would prove to have less success than the 
localization of the Infantry regiments because of the 
continued maintenance of the Royal Artillery as a single 
regiment. But during his remaining years at the War Office, 
Cardwell tried to compensate for this shortcoming by 
increasing the total of horse-drawn guns in the Royal 
Artillery from 180 to 336, and by adding about 5,000 men 
to its ranks;
Cardwell made no mention of his plans for the Cavalry" 
in his speech on the localization of the forces, but as it 
later developed, the Cavalry forces were divided into two 
districts with the same organization as the Infantry and
45Biddulph, p. 173. ^6Ensor, p. 15.
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47the Royal Artillery. As with the Royal Artillery, this 
scheme was met with less, success than the localization of 
the Infantry due to the social entrenchment of its officers. 
Again Cardwell compensated for this arrangement by increasing 
the strength of the Cavalry from 8,762 to 10,422 men.^
In contrast with most of Cardwell's previous legis­
lation, his localization of the forces scheme was received 
by both sides of the House of Commons with a .general chorus 
of approval. Cardwell was praised for having constructed 
a plan which when perfected would -form the foundation upon 
which a sound military organization might be erected.
Even the specific details of the plan were not harshly 
criticized, though some members of Parliament strongly 
advised that each pair of regiments should be fused together. 
This sound advice, however, was not .acted upon until 1881,
when the officers and men of the linked battalions were
50amalgamated into one regimental corps.
After Parliament gave its approval to the localization 
scheme, Cardwell proposed the Military Forces Localization
47B_ S_. P., XVIII (1873), 1.
4^Wood, p. 32 8. 4^Biddulph, p. 177.
5QIbid., p. 178
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(Expenses) Bill to effectuate the plan. In the bill, Cardwell 
asked Parliament for the appropriation of 113,500,000 to pur­
chase land on which the depot training centers could.be
established and also to construct barrack housing on those 
51centers. The localization scheme was not, however, the 
sole reason for the need of buildings as additional housing 
was also required for the Militia. In addition, the with­
drawal of Army troops from abroad created the imperative
52need for additional barrack construction at home.
Even though Parliament heartily approved of the
localization scheme, serious opposition developed over the
bill designed to put it into effect. The arguments against
the appropriation measure were many and varied. Some members
of Parliament argued that the. expense was too great; some
felt that localization would eventually turn Great Britain
into a military state; others thought the depot centers
would become focal points for immorality and vice through-
53out the nation. During the violent debates on the bill,
51R. S_. _P. , "Military Forces Localization (Expenses) 
Bill," III (1872), 217. Of the sixty-six depot centers, 
forty of the old stations were to.be reconverted, and 
twenty-six new stations were to be constructed.
^^Biddulph, pp. 182-183. ^Erickson, p. 89.
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Gladstone remained silent on the matter as it was his custom 
to let his ministers carry their own bills. In this 
instance, however, Cardwell became annoyed by Gladstone's 
silence. He informed Gladstone that the opposition would 
cease "'if they clearly understood from you that the Bill
is part of the Army policy of Government, and that . . .  it
. 54is indispensable.'" With this urging Gladstone rose to
defend the bill and did so with great skill. As a- result,
55shortly before the session ended, on August 10, 1872,
56the measure was passed.
Like most of Cardwell's reforms the localization
scheme was not entirely new. Even Cardwell admitted this
and attributed the principle on which it was established
to William Pitt (the younger) who stated in 1803:
'The Army must be the rallying point. The Army
must furnish example, must afford instruction,
must give us the principles on which the national
system of defence must be formed, and by which
the . . . /auxiliary/ forces of this country,
though in a military view inferior to the regular
army, would, fighting on their own soil . . . ,
5 7be invincible.'
■^Cardwell to Gladstone, July 22, 1872, Gladstone 
Papers, 35: f/ 40-41 (Br. Mus. Add. MSS., 44120), as 
cited by Erickson, p. 89.
55Erickson, p. 89. 56Hansard's, CCXIV, 866.
5 7 , . tIbid.
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Cardwell was not the first to propose the linked battalion
system either, for in 182 5, Lord Palmerston attempted to
create such a system. This attempt failed because strategic
defense demanded that .a greater proportion of regiments be
58kept abroad rather than at home. Cardwell's success in
linking the battalions resulted because the need for
garrisoning troops all over the world no longer existed.
With the development of the steamship, Cardwell was allowed
the liberty to concentrate British forces at home as modern
steamships could quickly transport British troops to any
59threatened point. This fact changed the concepts of 
defending British interests abroad, and Cardwell capitalized 
on it. Admittedly, the ideas on which the new British Army 
were established were not entirely Cardwell's, but the fact 
remains he gave them new meaning by making them a reality..
58Arthur, p. 70. 59Omond, pp. 109-110.
CHAPTER VI
/
MEN, MATERIEL, AND MOBILIZATION
In spite of administrative and organizational 
reforms, Cardwell realized that Britain's military system 
would fail to show much improvement if the Army continued 
to rely on the weaponry and combat skills required in the 
past. Admittedly, a modern military system needed both 
an administration and an organization which were highly 
efficient, but in and of themselves they did not con­
stitute an army. Cardwell knew that without the most 
modern weapons and systematic training, the bravest and 
best administered soldiers were doomed to defeat. During 
his tenure at the War Office, Cardwell was constantly 
aware of this fact and continually sought to improve the 
officers, weaponry, and combat readiness of Britain's 
fighting forces.
Prior to the abolition of purchase in 1871, the 
British Army was weakened by the mediocrity of its officers 
as few opportunities were provided for their instruction
112
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in the art of warfare.'*' Holding firm to his belief that no
officer should be allowed to command men in combat unless
possessed with the ability and knowledge for such a command,
Cardwell took necessary steps to improve the military
2education of Britain's Army officers. Previous to his
arrival at the War Office, a Royal Commission had been
appointed in 1868 to study the state of military education
in the Army. After nearly two years of gathering ‘information,
3it presented its report to Parliament on February 1, 1870.
In this report the Royal Commission advised that a Director-
General of Military Education be established to facilitate
a badly needed program of officer education. Given this
advice, Cardwell abolished the inactive Council of Military
Education on. March 31, 1870, and created the office of the
4Director-Gerteral of Military Education. Acting through 
this new department, Cardwell established military schools 
for Army officers at various military posts .throughout the
^B. s. P.. , "First Report by the Director-General of 
Military Education,"XVIII (1873), 63.
n
^Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 90.
^Hansard 1s , CC, 1553.
§.• R- r XVIII (1873), 49. Cardwell appointed 
William Napier as the first Director-General of Military 
Education.
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5 . . .  6
country. Beginning instruction on September 1, 1870,
these schools offered courses in military, law, field
fortifications, military sketching, and reconnaissance.
In conjunction with these schools reference libraries were
also established to encourage individual study of military 
8
subjects.
In addition to recommending the establishment of a 
Department of Military Education, the Royal Commission 
advised that the Army require of its officer candidates
nothing more than the ordinary liberal education of the
9 . . .country. Using this principle as its guide-lme, the Royal
Commission further recommended that in the competitive 
examinations for new officers the government place a 
greater reliance on the classical subjects and depress 
the modern languages and sciences.^ In making this 
recommendation the Royal Commission argued that "cramming" 
for the entrance exams could be prevented as it was of the
^Ibid., p . 63.
^Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 90.
7B. IS. P., XVIII (1873), 63. 8 Ibid. , p.. 64.
9 10Hansard1s, CC, 1576. Ibid., p. 1561.
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opinion the sciences could more easily be committed to
11memory than classical knowledge.
'Many members of Parliament reacted to this advice 
by voicing their immediate protest’ against Lhe Royal
Commission for suggesting that"... our officers . . .
■ ' 12 
sleep on antique Greek and Roman beds. . . . "  Adding
a ringing tone to their argument, these members exclaimed
with astonishment that classical knowledge was certainly
not the emphasis'in Prussia. In answer to this charge
the Royal Commission admitted a higher standard of
scientific knowledge did exist in the Prussian Army, but
it explained this was due to the fact that science largely -
composed the general educatiorf^of the country; in Great
Britain this was not•the case. If Britain wished to apply
a remedy then it should do so in its schools and universities
before it demanded higher requirements for scientific
knowledge in the officer entrance examinations. Remaining
convinced that the Army must follow the country, not lead
it as in the case of Prussia, the Royal Commission stood
its ground.^
lllh±d., p. 1565.
1 3 I b i d ., p. 1576.
12 I b i d . , p. 1567.
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Seeking to encourage Britain's best educated young
men to enter the Army, Cardwell assumed a moderate position
in the wake of this controversy. Rather than disparaging
the sciences for the purpose of raising the classics or vice
versa, Cardwell thought it best to seek a varied education
in the officer entrance exams. Viewing the Army as a
microcosm of the nation, Cardwell maintained that the
military service ought to contain every excellence which
14the country could produce. Keeping this' objective m  mmd, 
Cardwell instructed the Director-General of Military Education 
to draw up a detailed scheme of military education in which 
stricter examinations would be required for commissions.
As a result, entrance examinations were constructed around 
a liberal program of education rather than emphasizing the 
sciences or the classics. Knowledge of subjects such as 
Hindustani, geometry, and drawing was no longer required, 
but at the same time, knowledge of the French and German 
languages was made mandatory. In addition to the stricter 
entrance examinations, promotions in rank were made dependent
upon similar exams which indicated high mental and physical
. 15proficiency.
14Ibid., p. 1579. 15Erickson, p. 93.
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Ever since the Austro-Prussian War, British
authorities recognized that much of Prussia's military
success was due to her custom of assembling a large number
of troops under conditions which closely resembled war.
Divided into two opposing armies, these maneuvers were of
special value to the Prussian Army as they implemented
classroom knowledge through the practical instruction of
16troops, staff, and commanding officers. As a-means of
implementing military education in a similar manner,
Cardwell decided to institute annual maneuvers in the
British Army. In adopting this Prussian practice, Cardwell
was again departing from tradition as Britain had held only
one Army maneuver between Waterloo and the Crimean War, and
17it involved only 1 0 , 0 0 0  men..
Early in 1871, Cardwell secured the passage of an 
act which provided for the assembling of troops that coming 
autumn in Berkshire and parts of Hampshire and Surrey 
counties. Precautions were taken to prevent unnecessary 
damage to property, and a' court of arbitration was established,.
^ Army Book, p. 46.
17Erickson, p. 90. Training on a large scale was 
largely neglected during this period because the Army was 
dispersed throughout England and Ireland in small police 
units. Woodward ■, p. 2 6 8 .
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to assess the unavoidable damages caused by the operation. 1 8  
On July 31, 1871, shortly before the maneuvers were planned 
to begin, the whole operation was called off as it was 
decided to hold a similar but smaller operation between 
Chobham and Aldershot. When asked about this change of 
plans, Cardwell replied that a late harvest was expected in 
the Berkshire area, and the farmers' horses, which were 
needed for Army transport., would still be in use. This 
excuse was highly inadequate, and the press promptly issued 
a barrage of criticism. In rebuttal Cardwell stated that 
the War Council had investigated the Berkshire region and 
discovered it was not a suitable location for holding 
maneuvers due to the following reasons: the region lacked
proper fencing; its impure water made it a typhoid area; and 
its clay soil would make it difficult for the troops to 
maneuver if it rained during the operation. Poor as these 
arguments were, Cardwell knew the real reason for canceling 
the large maneuvers at Berkshire was due to the fact that 
the Control Department was not equal to the task. Cardwell, 
however, would not publicly admit this fact because such
^Erickson, p. 90; Biddulph, p. 189.
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action would have merely redirected the criticism to Henry
1 9Storks, the head of that department.
With the large maneuvers at Berkshire having been
canceled, a smaller maneuver was held around Aldershot
during the first part of September. It proved to be a
real fiasco. The whole operation was indicative of its
start as the horses of the first Life Guards stampeded.
Throughout the maneuver the officers remained similarly
spirited, but they lacked a definite knowledge of procedure.
As a result, orders for the next morning1s activities were
never issued the night before; therefore, the troops were
left almost totally ignorant of what was going on. Making
matters worse, much of the equipment was obsolete, and
20
this resulted in frequent breakdowns. In addition, the 
troops made numerous complaints about their daily meat 
rations as the Cattle Contagious Diseases Act required that 
all animals be slaughtered in London. Instead of having 
the animals sent along with the troops in flocks and herds, 
the meat was sent out daily from London to the troops by
^Erickson, p. 90. ^8 Ibid.
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train. But by the time the meat passed through the various
depots and commissaries, the troops received their rations
21late at night or not at all.
Despite the many shortcomings of the maneuver, the
operation proved valuable as it revealed precisely where
22improvements were needed. Realizing that no one individual
could be blamed for the failure, Cardwell criticized no one.
Instead, he attributed the disappointing results to a general
lack of. experience in holding military maneuvers. In the
future, however, he hoped the Army would rectify its mistakes
. 2 3and prevent them from recurring.
The following year (1872) Army maneuvers were held
on a much larger scale in the counties of Wiltshire and
24 .
Dorset. Many foreign observers from various continental
armies were invited to attend this assemblage of troops
which was considerably larger than the British force that
21 Ibid.; "Autumnal Manoeuvres," Blackwood 1s Edinburgh 
Magazine, CXI (March, 1872), 325. Hereafter cited as
"Autumnal Manoeuvres,"
^Erickson, p. 90; "Autumnal Manoeuvres," CXI, 323.
Erickson, pp. 90-91.
2 4Biddulph, p. 189; Erickson, p. 91.
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2 Slanded m  the Crimea in 1854. Luckily, these maneuvers
went off much more successfully than the previous year, and
all Army departments, with the exception of the Control
2 6Department, exhibited considerable improvement. As 
usual the Control Department performed its duties badly.
For example, men who were familiar only with the issuance 
of medical supplies and utensils were suddenly placed in
27
charge of purchasing hay and oats for the Cavalry horses.
Together with various other mismanaged arrangements, it was
no wonder the system of transport and supply broke down.
Maneuvers were held once again in the autumn of
187 3, but since the Duke of Cambridge felt that it was
unwise to assemble the entire force each year, three smaller
operations were held at Dartmoor, Cannock Chase, and 
2 8Curragh. In each instance the officers and men performed 
their duties well, but once again the Control Department 
proved unequal to the task. This time, however, the reasons
2 5 Biddulph, p. 189. 2 6 Erickson, p. 91.
2 7"Qur Autumn Manoeuvres," Blackwood1s Edinburgh 
Magazine, CXII (November, 1872), 639.
2^Erickson, p. 91; Biddulph, p. .190.
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for its breakdown were obvious. The department was simply
being overworked as it lacked sufficient men and equipment
to perform its functions properly. In addition, its tasks
were made more difficult by the officers and men of the
combat troops who consistently failed to give the department
29their full cooperation.
Since Cardwell prepared the Army Estimates for the
last time in 1874, he arranged to have maneuvers held
during the coming autumn. After 1874, however, maneuvers
30
were not held again until 1898. Regretably, this was a 
great mistake for while the annual maneuvers were held 
the officers and troops gained training and experience 
which could be acquired in no other way short of war. In 
addition, the annual maneuvers were important because they 
brought public attention to the military forces. The 
nation saw that it could field an Army of 100,000 men 
and still have a small but steadily growing Reserve Force 
to back it up. Correspondingly, the public realized that 
the Militia was better prepared to fight along side the
2^Erickson, p.. 91.
30 Ibid.; Biddulph, p. 190, n. 1.
123
Regular Army, and that the Volunteers were better trained 
and more reliable for home defense. As The Times (London) 
put it:
These are facts which the country ought distinctly 
to appreciate, and if the Autumn Manoeuvres did 
nothing else but bring them prominently forward, 
the exertions of Mr. Cardwell and of the officers 
who have so ably carried his views into effect 
would be well repaid.
Up until the Austro-Prussian War, the Infantry of the
British Army relied on the Enfield rifle which was first
used successfully during the latter part of the Crimean 
32War. This muzzle-loading weapon was highly regarded by 
the military authorities until the outbreak of the Schleswig- 
Holstein War when it was discovered the Prussian breech­
loader could fire three rounds for every round fired by
33 • ■the Enfield. Frightened by this report British military
authorities appointed a committee in 1864 to investigate
and report on the practicability of adopting a breech-loading
•^The Times (London), September 13, 1873, p. 9.
3 2 E. G. B. Reynolds, The Lee-Enfield Rifle (London: 
Herbert Jenkins, 1960), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Reynolds.
^"Inefficiency of the British Armyy " CXXIX, 520.
12.4
34
rifle for use m  the British Army. After the committee
reached a favorable decision, an exhaustive testing program
was established at the Woolwich Arsenal where some fifty
35different breech-loading systems were closely examined.
While the British were conducting their exhaustive
trials at Woolwich, the Austro-Prussian War erupted on the
continent. The overwhelming effect of the breech-loader in
the hands of the Prussian Infantry forced Britain to speed
36the adoption of a similar arm for its own use. In 1867,
as a temporary expedient, the British adopted a breech-
37
loading system submitted by an American, Jacob Snider,
because it allowed for the conversion of the muzzle-loading
Enfields into breech-loading Sniders. Hence, the official
name for the new arm was the Snider-Enfield rifle, and it
had the distinction of becoming the first breech-loader
3 8adopted for use in the British Army.
^Reynolds, p. 18. It is interesting to note that 
shortly before the death of Prince Albert in 1861, the 
Queen's husband had unsuccessfully urged Lord Palmerston 
to seek the adoption of a breech-loading weapon for the 
Army. Ensor, p. 14.
3 5 Reynolds, p. 19. 3 6 Biddulph, pp. 36-37.
■^Reynolds, p. 19. 38Ibid., p. 20.
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Since the Snider rifle was adopted only as a stop-
gap measure, a new committee was appointed in late 1867
to inquire into the possibility of adopting a weapon
superior to the Snider conversion system. After considering
many possibilities the committee recommended for trial a
weapon embodying a breech action invented by Frederich
Von Martini of Switzerland and a barrel designed by
39
Alexander Henry of Edinburgh. Before the Martini-Henry
rifle could be officially adopted, however, it was necessary
to test it under varying conditions and different climates.
As a result, some of these rifles were issued for trial at
40
home, m  India, and m  Canada.
Meanwhile, on becoming Secretary of War in December
1868, Cardwell discovered the Regular Army was only partially
equipped with the breech-loading Snider-Enfield, while the
Militia and Volunteers were, still using the old muzzle-
41
loading Enfields. Early in 1869, Cardwell took necessary
<3
steps to speed up the gradual arming of the Regular Army and
42
the auxiliary forces with the Snider-Enfield rifle. When
3 ^ Ibid.. ^Biddulph, pp. 36-37.
^"The Government Army Bill," CXXX, 560. 
^Biddulph, p. 36.
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the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, sixty-five
regiments of Militia and fifteen of Yeomanry had been so
armed. Cardwell, however, wanted all the military units
equipped with these weapons, and the issuance continued
43
until May 1871, when the task was finally completed.
In presenting the Army Estimates on March 11, 1869,
Cardwell informed the House of Commons that he had been
urged by competent authorities to substitute the Martini-
Henry rifle for the Snider-Enfield. Cardwell noted that
this advice could not be realized at the moment since the
Martini-Henry rifle had not yet undergone all of its
44extensive testing. It was not until two years later
that prolonged examination proved the worthiness of the
Martini-Henry rifle, and in April 1871, it was officially
45adopted for use in the British Army. This weapon was by
far superior to the Snider-Enfield, and between 1871 and
1874 the British Army was issued its first satisfactory
46breech-loader.
^ Ibid, , p. 69.
“^ Reynolds, p. 21.
4 4 Hansard,s, CXCIV, 1134. 
4 ^Ensor, p. 14.
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In the final analysis Cardwell knew that the quality
of the British Army depended not upon its administration,
organization, officers, or weaponry as much as it did upon
the welfare of the common soldier. Through the Army
Enlistment Act of 1870, which has been examined previously,
Cardwell improved conditions in the service for the common
soldier by shortening the length of enlistment, by abolishing
barbarous punishments, and by discharging - men of bad 
47character. While these reforms vastly improved the
quality and quantity of recruits, the men still did not
enlist in sufficient numbers as the unskilled laborer
earned somewhat higher wages than the ordinary soldier.
Since this especially tended to prevent men from joining
the military service during prosperous times, Cardwell
insisted on increasing the wages of the troops. After
overcoming some opposition, he secured the adoption of
48
an increased pay scale m  1873.
 ^ Prior to the wage increase each soldier received 
Is. 3 d. per day which included Id. per day for beer money.
The net pay of each soldier, however, was only 10%d. per
47See above, pp. 101-102. 48Erickson, pp. 92-93.
day as the ration stoppage fee of 4^d. was deducted for his
bread and meat rations. Since these monetary fractions
complicated Army accounting on payday and were a general
nuisance, Cardwell' abolished the ration stoppage and
increased each soldier's wages to an even Is. per day.
At the same time he arranged to have this pay scale
49adopted for the Militia also. As a result of this wage
increase, The Times (London) commented that the Infantry
soldier would be one of the best paid unskilled laborers
in the country as each soldier would receive food, lodging,
50clothing, education, and medical care plus Is. per day.
Supplementing the wage increase, Cardwell saw to it 
that the soldiers received many other extra benefits. He 
increased the allowances of men on furlough and made 
arrangements to give honorably discharged.soldiers employ­
ment preferences in the civil services, in the metropolitan 
police force, and in the Post Office. In addition, Cardwell 
provided separate quarters for married soldiers and ordered 
that all barracks be repaired. Recognizing that much of
4 9 IIansard,s, CCXIV, 876.
50The Times (London), February 25, 1873, p. 9.
Army life involved "organized idleness," Cardwell directed
commanding officers to arrange with the Royal Engineers
and the Control Department that all barrack repairs be made
by military labor whenever possible. In the process of
making needed repairs the soldiers were not only paid for
their work, but they were also taiught various trades which
would be of help to them once they were discharged from
51
military service.
As a result of the foregoing improvements, together 
with Cardwell's organizational and administrative reforms, 
the British Army was better prepared for a national war 
in 1874 than it had been in 1868. During the nearly six 
years in which Cardwell reformed and reorganized the Army, 
he was very fortunate that no large-scale war erupted. In 
his last year at the War Office, however, one small colonial 
war involving the Ashantee tribe on the Gold Coast of West 
Africa did occur. Due to the British embargo on slave 
trade and the British control of the Gold Coast port cities, 
the slave-trading Ashantees were annoyed because the British 
were menacing their chief source of wealth. Failing to
61 .Erickson, p. 93.
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obtain the chief port of Elmina by negotiation, the Ashantees
invaded the British protectorate early in 1873, in an effort
52to acquire a slave emporium.
At first, opinion in Gladstone's Cabinet was badly
divided over.what action it should take. On the insistence,
however, of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, and
Cardwell, the Cabinet decided to send an expedition against
53
the Ashantees. Sir Garnet Wolseley was placed in command
of this expedition, and suffice it to say that after landing
on the Gold Coast in October 1873, the expedition was brought
to a successful conclusion five months later. Ironically,
the news of the successful expedition did not reach Britain
until after Gladstone's Ministry had fallen from power as
a result of the Liberal defeat at the polls in the general
54elections of February 1874.
It might be said, therefore, that Cardwell's last
act as Secretary of War was to make an effective use of the
5 5Army which he had so diligently reformed and reorganized.
5 2 Ibid. , p. 94. 5 3 Ibid.
^Biddulph, p. 223; Erickson, pp. 94-95. 
^^Biddulph, p. 223.
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On the day-before he left the War Office Cardwell wrote to 
Lord Northbrook referring to the Ashantee Expedition in 
these words:
'Precision had anticipated everything that could.be 
desired, and if it were to be done over again,
. . . . nothing different ,/could be suggested/. How
was this accomplished? Not by any knowledge on my
part of such affairs, but by the simple fact . . .  
/of/ having an admirably organized office. . .
In terms of efficiency the Ashantee War of 1873-1874 proved
that Cardwell's work was not in vain for a larger but
similar campaign in Abyssinia in 1868 had cost £8,600,000
5 7while the Ashantee Expedition had cost only £900,000.
To be sure, the Ashantee Expedition was only a small-scale
war against savages, but it must be remembered that it was
performed in an area where no European troops had previously 
served. Had not an efficient Army organization been in 
existence, the expedition might have entailed greater cost,
ir o
or possibly it might have ended in disaster.
56Ibid., p. 224.
-^Biddulph, 22 5.
“^ Wheeler, p. 221.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Unlike many of his fellow Liberals, Cardwell was
elected to the House of Commons in the general elections
of February 1874.^ Shortly thereafter, he was elevate'd to
2the House of Lords as Viscount Cardwell of Ellerbeck.
During the next few years Lord Cardwell continued to
participate in public affairs within the calmer atmosphere
of his peerage, but never again did he become a minister 
•3
of state.
Cardwell's years at the War Office placed a heavy 
burden upon his health, and after he stepped down from 
his secretaryship, it rapidly deteriorated. By 1879, he 
was quite ill and rarely attended the House of Lords. A' 
year later Cardwell went to Montfleury, France to rest and 
recuperate. His health, however, continued to deteriorate,
and by 1883, he no longer had normal use of his once
^Erickson, p. 99. ^Ibid. ; D. N. B_. , III, 953.
3D. N. R. , III, 953. 4Erickson, p. 99.
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brilliant mind for a large part of the time. From Montfleury,
ir
he was taken to Cannes, and from there to Torquay, England,
6where he died on February 15, 1886.
As a political figure in nineteenth century Britain, 
Cardwell's importance largely rests on his performance at 
the War Office. When he became Secretary of War late in 
1868, the Army establishment existed largely unchanged since 
the days of the Stuarts. Its administration was'highly 
inefficient; its organization was archaic; its officers 
lacked technical and professional skills; and, its conditions 
of service Were barely tolerable for the common soldier.
During his administration at the War Office Cardwell managed 
to reorganize the administration of the Army, abolish the 
systems of dual control and the purchase of commissions, 
introduce the system of short-service, improve the con­
ditions of military service, and adopt the principle of 
localization for the Army and Reserve units. ,As a result, 
when Cardwell departed the War Office early in 1874, Great
^Ibid., p. 1 0 0 .
°Ibid. y D. N. B^. , III, 953. Upon his death Cardwell's 
peerage became extinct for his marriage to Annie, the 
youngest daughter of Charles Stuart Parker of Fairlie, 
Ayrshire, in 1838, was not blessed with children. D. N. 13. , 
III, 953.
Britain possessed a modernized Army that was larger than
any previous peacetime force in British History. Yet for
all his efforts Cardwell left the Army Estimates at a
7
lower figure than when he assumed office in 1868.
On Cardwell's departure from the War Office many
members of the Conservative Party urged that his successor,
Gathorne-Hardy, drastically alter the essential- parts of
the Cardwell reforms. Recognizing that the Cardwellian
system met the momentary needs of the British people both
at home and abroad, Gathorne-Hardy, as well as his successors,
8refused to make significant changes in it. As the recipient 
of this fitting tribute, the Cardwellian system contributed 
significantly to the good fighting record of the British 
troops in the overseas colonies during the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. But due to the fact that 
Cardwell’s successors accepted the Cardwellian system 
without adding necessary alterations to meet changing needs, 
the eventual breakdown of the Cardwellian system became 
inevitable. As Cardwell left it, the British Army was a 
well-organized fighting machine; nevertheless, there was
7See Appendix E, p. 150. 8Erickson, pp. 99-100.
room for further reform. In a period when continental armies 
were introducing General Staffs to handle the complex 
problems of military administration, Cardwell’s successors 
allowed the Duke of Cambridge to remain as Commander-in- 
Chief until his retirement in 1895. Eventually, the 
combined effect of the Duke's presence in the office of 
the Commander-in-Chief together with the lack of a General 
Staff yielded humiliating results during the Boer War in 
South Africa.
With the conclusion of the Boer War, the opening 
years of the twentieth century brought forth a new era of 
military reform in Great Britain. These years saw the 
creation of an Imperial General Staff, the improvement 
of the territorial system, and the construction of the 
British Expeditionary Force. These reforms were long 
overdue, but nevertheless, on the eve of World War I the 
British military system still rested on the principles 
which Cardwell had introduced. Short-service.still 
supplied men for the Army Reserve; localization still 
associated the regiments with territorial districts; and, 
the fighting units at home were still balanced with those
9
serving garrison duty abroad. Thus, Cardwell's reforms 
were of such magnitude that he can be called the father of 
the modern British Army.
As .an able Victorian administrator Cardwell ranks as 
one of the greatest military reformers in British history. 
Unlike Scharnhorst, his Prussian counterpart during the 
early nineteenth century, Cardwell did not achieve his reforms 
with the impetus of military defeat such as the Prussians . 
received after Jena. Unquestionably, the impact of Prussian 
militarism served to weaken the old Army order in Britain, and 
Cardwell's cause was thereby given indirect aid. Nevertheless, 
his reforms were viewed with suspicion by many and staunchly 
opposed by the Queen, by the Duke of Cambridge, by the Army 
establishment, by the Conservative Party, and by many members 
within his own Liberal Party. Due to this almost insurmount­
able opposition, Army reform might never have been achieved 
between 1868 and 1874 without Cardwell’s indomitable courage, 
perseverance, tact, and pressure. To be sure, Great Britain 
was served more brilliantly by other men of his generation, 
but none served their country more faithfully, more strenu­
ously, or with more lasting results.
9 .For details of Army reform during this period see,
John K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 1899- 
1914 (London: Methuen, 1938).
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
MEMORANDUM SHOWING THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR OFFICE'BETWEEN 1854 AND 18691
Prior to the year 1854, the different Departments 
connected with the Army, Militia, and Volunteer forces, 
were as follow:—
(1) Two Secretaries of State for War and Colonies and 
Home.
(2) General Commanding-in-Chief.
(-3) Ordnance Office.
Master-General of the Ordnance.
Clerk of the Ordnance 
Surveyor-General of the Ordnance.
Principal Storekeeper.
Inspector-General of Fortifications. 
Director-General of Artillery.
(4) Treasury (Commissariat).
(5) Secretary at War.
(6) Army Medical Department.
(7) Audit Office.
(8) Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital.
(9) Board of General Officers.
(10) Paymaster-General.
On 12th June, 1854, a fourth Secretary of State was 
established for the Department of War, and on the 11th 
August, 1854, an Order in Council was passed providing the 
necessary Establishment for carrying on the duties of the 
Office.
^"Cited verbatim from Clode, The Mi 1 itary Forces of 
the Crown, II, 769-776.
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On the 14th November, 1854, another Order in Council 
was passed, adding a second permanent Under-Secretary of 
State for the War Department.
The other Military Departments still existed separately, 
but the Secretary of State for War assumed and exercised 
control over all of them.
In December, 1854, the Commissariat was transferred 
from the Treasury to the War Department, including the 
Banking business connected with the Treasury Chest, as well 
as the business hitherto performed by the Audit Office of 
the examination of the Commissariat Cash and Store Accounts.
In January, 1855, a Topographical Department was 
formed under a Director.
In February, 1855, the office of Secretary at War 
was combined with that of Secretary of State— the Secretary 
of State for War receiving, in addition to his Patent as 
Secretary of State, a Commission as Secretary at War.
In March, 1855, the Business connected with the 
Militia was transferred from the Home Office to the War 
Department.
Om the 18th May, 1855, the Business connected with 
the Militia was transferred from the Home Office to the 
War Department.
On the 18th May, 1855, a Patent was granted to the 
Secretary of State for War, vesting in him the administration 
of the Army and Ordnance, "except so far as relates to and 
concerns the Military Command and discipline thereof shall 
have been committed to, vested in, or regulated by the 
Commander-in-Chief;" and on the 25th May the Secretary of 
State transferred the Command and discipline of the Ordnance 
Corps to the General Commanding-in-Chief, who was thus placed 
in command of the whole Army. An act (18 & 19 Vic., cap. 117) 
was also passed, vesting in the Secretary of State all the 
estates and powers formerly held and exercised by the Board 
of Ordnance.
On the 6th June, 1855, an Order in Council was passed, 
settling the future constitution of the Civil Departments 
of the Army as follow;—
(1) Clerk of the Ordnance.
(2) Inspector-General of Fortifications.
(3) Director-General of Artillery.
(4) Director-General of Naval Artillery.
(5) Director-General of Stores.
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(6) Director—General of Contracts.
(7) Director-General of Clothing.
(8) Accountant General; and
(9) Superintendents for each of the Manufacturing
Departments.
These Officers were in addition to those included in 
the Establishments of the War Department, War Office, etc.
In January, 1856, a Committee was appointed by the 
then Secretary of State (Lord Panmure) to consider and 
recommend a definite distribution of the duties of the 
Officers consolidated under the Secretary of State for
War, and of the several classes of Clerks, so as by an
uniform scale of renumeration to render them available 
for any branch of the^  War Department.
The recommendations of the Committee, which reported 
on the 3rd January, 1856, were agreed to by the Treasury, 
and the consolidation of the several branches of the War 
Department was then completed.
This consolidated Department thus .included the duties 
of the Secretary of State's Office the Militia business of 
the Home Office, the War Office, the Ordnance Office, 
Commissariat and Medical Departments, the examination of 
the Cash and Store Accounts of the Commissariat Department, 
the examination of the payments made by the Paymaster- 
General for non-effective Services, and the duties of the 
Board of General Officers relating to Clothing.
The Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital still retained 
the duty of placing soldiers on the Out-pension List, 
though the expenditure of both In and Out pensions was 
borne on the Army Estimates.
On the 2nd February, 1857, another Order in Council 
was passed (revoking the Orders of the 11th August and 
14th November, 1854, and 6th June, 185 5), by which the 
following alterations were effected in the Superior appoint­
ments of the Office.
(1) One Under-Secretary of State reduced.
(2) One Clerk of the Ordnance abolished.
(3) One Director-General of Clothing reduced.
(4) One Principal Clerk discontinued.
The Naval Director-General of Artillery was appointed 
Director of Stores, continuing to perform the duties of the 
former Office.
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And the following Offices were created:—
(1) One Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
(2) One Secretary for Military correspondence.
(3) The Office of Deputy Secretary at War Was merged
into that of Under-Secretary of State.
In July, the Topographical Department, the Military 
Depot of the Quartermaster-General's Office, and the 
Ordnance Survey, hitherto a branch of the Inspector- 
General of Fortifications' Office, were placed under an 
Officer of the Royal Engineers as a Director immediately 
responsible to the Secretary of State.
In September, the Banking business connected with 
the Treasury Chest was re-transferred to the Treasury.
In October, the Office of Examiner of Army Accounts 
was abolished, and a Senior Clerk, under the title of 
Assistant Accountant-General, was appointed to perform 
the duties. -
In 1857 the business connected with the Army Schools 
was taken from the Chaplain-General and entrusted t6 a 
Military Officer— Inspector-General of Schools. A Board 
of Military Officers, called the Council of Military 
Education, was also established on the 1st of June in this 
year for conducting the examination of Officers, and placed 
under the control of the General Commanding-in-Chief.
In the same year, upon the gradual disembodiment of 
the Militia after the Russian War, a Military Officer, to 
act under the Secretary of State, was appointed as Inspector 
of Militia.
In April, 1858, the Treasury appointed a Committee 
to enquire into the duties of the Account Branch of the 
War Office. The main recommendation of the Committee was. 
the transfer of the preparation of the Estimates of the 
Accountant-General. Owing to a change in the Government, 
nothing was done to carry out this recommendation.
In May, 1859, the following alterations in the 
organization of the War Office were decided upon:—
1. Transfer to the General Commanding-in-Chief of the 
purely Military duties of the Inspector-General
of Fortifications and Director-General of Artillery, 
and the abolition of the latter office.
2. Formation of a permanent Defence Committee.
3. Reconstruction of the Ordnance Select Committee.
4. Transfer of the management of Regimental Schools 
and Libraries to the Council of Military Education, 
the abolition of the appointment of Inspector- 
General of Schools.
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The Inspector-General o f 'Fortifications still remained 
the Official Adviser to the Secretary of State on all questions 
relating to fortifications and other works, and was also 
charged with, the execution of those works; he was also a 
member of the permanent Defence Committee; but he was wholly 
relieved of.his Military duties as Commandant of the Corps 
of Royal Engineers.
The Ordnance Select Committee was re-constructed, and 
the President of the Committee took charge of that portion 
of the duties of the Director-General of Artillery which 
still remained in the War Office.
In November, 1859, the Treasury appointed a new 
Committee to enquire into the duties of the Account Branch; 
and in June, 1860, the Committee made a first Report, 
repeating the recommendation of the Committee of 1858, in 
regard to the transfer of the Estimates to the Accountant- 
General, and further recommending the separation of the 
Account Branch from the General Office in respect of 
establishment and promotion.
The appointment of an additional Assistant Accountant- 
General was also recommended, who should be charged with the 
preparation of the Estimates and the Bookkeeping Branch.
These recommendations were carried into effect in 
August, 1860.
The Volunteer Force having so largely increased in 
1859, and a Military Officer being required to superintend 
the organization and discipline of the Force, an Inspector- 
General, with a deputy, was appointed in January, 1860, ■ 
and placed in charge of the Civil business of the Force.
In March, the transfer of the superintendence of 
Army Schools and Libraries to the Council of Military 
Education under the control of the General Commanding- 
in-Chief was carried out, and the appointment of Inspector- 
General of Schools abolished.
In November, a Librarian and Precis-writer was 
appointed.
In December, the Inspector of Militia was placed in 
charge of the Civil business of the Militia in the War 
Office, and the designation of the appointment was altered 
to that of Inspector-General.
In January, 1861, a recommendation, founded on the 
report of the Select Committee on Military Organization, 
was referred to the Treasury for the appointment of a 
Director of Ordnance, who would relieve the President of
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the Ordnance Select Committee of that portion of his duties 
as Adviser to the Secretary of State on Artillery and 
Armaments, and also be placed in charge of the whole of 
the Manufacturing Departments.
At the same time the Secretary of State expressed his 
intention of appointing at some future date a Director of 
Supplies, who would be charged with the supply and issue of 
all stores (not being munitions of War). In accordance with 
this proposal a Director of Ordnance was appointed in 
July, 1861.
In May, the Secretary for Military Correspondence 
(Major-General. Sir E. Lugard) was appointed Under-Secretary 
of State, the former appointment being abolished.
About the same time a Military Officer, on half-pay 
and receiving Staff-pay, was appointed to assist' the Under­
secretary of State.
In November, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
died and his appointment was not filled up.
In December, a Military Officer was appointed to 
assist the Director of Ordnance, and styled Assistant 
Director of Ordnance.
In February, 1862, a Committee which had been appointed 
to inquire into the Establishments of the several branches 
of the War Office, fixed the number and classification of 
the Clerks to be in future borne on those Establishments, 
exclusive of the Account Department and Solicitors' Branch.
In May, the Office of Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State was revived, and Captain Galton, appointed thereto, 
the third Under-Secretary of State being at the same time 
abolished.
In June, the Barrack Department was transferred from 
the control of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and 
was formed into a separate branch under an Engineer Officer 
as Superintendent.
In September, the designation of the Inspector- 
General of Fortifications was altered into Inspector-General 
of Engineers and Director of Works; in the former capacity 
he was reinstated in the command.of the Corps of Royal 
Engineers and placed in immediate communication with the 
Commander-in-Chief; in the latter he was under the direct 
control of the Secretary of State for War. The Office of 
Deputy Inspector-General of Fortifications was abolished.
Two Deputy Directors of Works, one for Barracks 
and the other for Fortifications and Civil; Buildings, were 
created. (These Officers of the Royal Engineers had
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previously held similar appointments under the Inspector- 
General of Fortifications.)
In June, the Clothing business was separated from 
the Store Department, and on 2 3rd February, 1863, was made 
into a distinct branch under a Director of Clothing.
In May, 1863, an Act was passed abolishing the Office * 
of Secretary at War, and vesting in the Secretary of State 
the duties and powers of that office.
In June, 1864, another Committee was proposed to the 
Treasury for the purpose of inquiring into the Establish­
ment of the War Office. The reports of this Committee 
commenced in September, 1864, and continued from time to 
time until May, 1865.
Their recommendations resulted in the following 
important, changes: —
1. The separation of the department, which had been 
previously under the sole control of the Accountant- 
General, into two branches. One under the Accountant- 
General, the other under the Chief Auditor of Army 
Accounts, an office for the first time created. The 
latter Officer took over a portion of the duties 
hitherto performed by the Accountant-General and
his two assistants; also the Audit of Barrack,
Store, and Kit accounts from the Barrack and 
Clothing branches; and eventually (1866) the 
audit of the Store Accounts from the Store 
Branch.
2. Of the two Assistant Accountants General, one was 
abolished on the appointment of the Chief Auditor; 
the other is to be abolished when a vacancy occurs.
3. The abolition of the appointment of Librarian and 
Precis-writer.
4. The substitution of Out-Station Clerks of the Royal 
Engineer Department in place of War Office Clerks 
in the office of the Director of Works.
5. The substitution of Barrack Officers and Military 
Clerks in the place of War Office Clerks in the 
Barrack branch.
6. The separation of the Clerical Establishment of 
the Army Medical Department and Clothing Branch 
from the rest of the War Office on distinct and 
lower scales of pay.
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7. The withdrawal from the Commissariat of the Clerks
on the Establishment of the War Office, and the
substitution of Commissariat Officers and Staff.
8. The introduction into the Chief Auditor's Branch 
and Clothing Department of Military and pensioned 
Non-commissioned Officer Clerks.
9. The formation of a Regulation Branch, with a view 
to the codification of the regulations.
In August, 1866, it was decided, in consequence of 
the great and important changes in Naval Ordnance, to appoint 
an officer of the rank of Rear-Admiral, to be attached to
the Admiralty and to Act as Director-General of Naval
Ordnance.
In December, 1867, in consequence of the recommendation 
of a Committee, presided over by Lord Strathnairn, appointed 
in June, 1866, to consider the question of Army Transports, 
but subsequently directed by General Peel to extend its 
inquiries into the administration of the Supply Department 
of the Army, a Military Office was appointed as Controller- 
in-Chief, to supervise and direct the various Departments 
of Transport, Commissariat, Store, Purveyor, and Barrack. 
Another Military Officer was appointed (temporarily) as 
his assistant.
In April, 1868, a Royal Warrant gave effect to this 
arrangement.
In consequence of this change, the appointments of 
Director of Stores and Superintendent of the Barrack 
Department were abolished in December, 1868.
In January, 1868, "with a view of increasing the 
efficiency of the local Military Forces, and also of 
securing unity of action in the event of their being at 
any time required for Service," an Inspector-General of 
Reserve Forces was appointed to supervise the Militia,
Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Enrolled Pensioners.
In November, a Director-General of Ordnance was 
appointed in place of the Director of Ordnance. A Deputy 
was appointed at the same time.
The Ordnance Select Committee was abolished, and a 
smaller Committee, styled the Artillery Committee, pre­
sided over by the Deputy Director-General of Ordnance, 
was appointed in its place.
The Director-General of Ordnance was also made 
Commandant of the Arsenal at Woolwich, and the heads of 
the various Manufacturing Departments were placed under 
his orders.
APPENDIX B
SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR BETWEEN 1855 AND 19001
Term Office-Holder
February 8, 1855 Lord Panmure
February 27, 1858 Jonathan Peel
June 19, 1859 Sidney Herbert
July 22, 1861 George Cornewall Lewis
April 28, 1863 G. F. S. Robinson
February 16, 1866 Spencer Compton Cavendish
July 6, 1866 Jonathan Peel
March 8, 1867 John Pakington
December 9, 1868 Edward Cardwell
February 21, 1874 Gathorne-Hardy
April 2, 1878 Frederick Arthur Stanley
April 28, 1880 Hugh Culling Eardley Childers
December 16, 1882 Spencer Compton Cavendish
June 24, 1884 William Henry Smith
January 4, 1887 Edward Stanhope
August 18, 1892 Henry Campbell-Bannerman
July 4, 1895-
October, 1900 Henry Charles Keith Petty-FitzMaurice
■**F. Maurice Powicke and F. B. Fryde, Handbook of
British Chronology (2nd ed.; London: Offices of the Royal
Historical Society, 1961), p. 121.
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APPENDIX C
Part
Part
Part
Part
THE ARMY REGULATIONS ACT— ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES1
I. Commissions in Her Majesty's Forces.
1. Abolition of purchase after November 1, 1871.
2. Compensation to officers holding saleable 
commissions.
3. Compensation to officers of certain Indian 
regiments.
4. Provision for expense of compensating officers.
II. Army Enlistment
5. Enlistment rules.
III. Auxiliary Forces
6. Jurisdiction of lieutenants of counties re­
vested in Her Majesty.
7. Number of auxiliary forces.
8. Voluntary enlistment in the Militia under
ordinary circumstances.
9. Training for Militia*
10. Increase of Militia in case of emergency by
voluntary enlistment, or, if necessary by 
ballot.
11. Liability to serve in case of ballot.
12. Classification for purposes of the Militia.
13. Engagement in Volunteers to qualify for
exemption from the ballot.
14. Application of Mutiny Act to Volunteers 
when in training.
IV. As to Sale of Commissions
15. Appointment of Commissioners to compensate 
officers.
16. Appointment of clerks by Commissioners.
1B. S. P. , I (1871), 11-13
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17. Powers and duties of Commissioners.
18. Decision of Commissioners to be conclusive.
As to the Ballot
19. Mode of balloting for the Militia.
20. Provisions to give effect to the ballot.
21. Definition of counties and division of counties.
22. Definition of justices of division, session,
and clerks of division.
23. Mode of ascertaining population for purposes 
of the ballot.
Rules by Secretary of State for War
24. Power to make rules.
2 5. Determine how returns in Militia to be made.
Part V. Miscellaneous
26. Power of Government to take possession of 
the railroads in an emergency.
27. Power of county or municipal boroughs to 
build barracks.
28. Incorporation of certain clauses of the 
General Acts.
29. Loan by Public Works Loan Commissioners.
30. Payment by Secretary of War for use of
barracks.
31. Power of militia and volunteer corps to
acquire land for any necessary purposes.
Penalties and Saving Clauses
32. Recovery of penalties.
33. Provision as to Quakers.
34- Saving of General Acts.
APPENDIX D
THE ROYAL WARRANT ABOLISHING PURCHASE IN THE ARMY1
Whereas by the Act passed in the Session held in the 
fifth and sixth years of the reign of King Edward VI, chapter 
16, intitled "Against Buying and Selling of Offices," and 
the Act passed in the forty-ninth year of George III, chapter 
126, intitled "An Act for the Prevention of the Sale and 
Brokerage of Offices," all officers in our forces are pro­
hibited from selling or bargaining for the sale of any money 
for the exchange of any such commission, under the penalty 
of forfeiture of their commissions, and of being cashiered, 
and of diverse other penalties; but the last-mentioned.Act 
exempts from the penalties of the said Acts purchase, or 
sales, or exchange of any commissions in our forces for such 
prices as may be regulated and fixed by any regulation made 
or to be made by us in that behalf.
And whereas we think it expedient to put an end to 
all such regulations, and to all sales and purchases, and 
all exchanges for money of commissions in our. forces, and 
all dealings relating to such sales, purchases or exchanges.
Now, our will and.pleasure is that on and after the 
1st day of November in this present year all regulations 
made by us or any of our Royal predecessors, or any officers 
acting under our authority, regulating or fixing the prices 
at which any commissions in our forces may be purchased, sold 
or exchanged or in any way authorizing the purchase, or sale, 
or exchange for money of any such commissions, shall be 
cancelled and determined.
Given at our Court at Osborne, this 20th day of July, 
in the thirty-fifth year of our reign. By her Majesty's 
command.
Edward Cardwell
1The Illustrated London News, July 29, 1871, p. 95.
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APPENDIX E
TABLE OF
Year____________
1868-1869
1869-1870
1870-1871
1871-1872
1872-1873
1873-1874
ARMY ESTIMATES1
_____________Net Amount
£13,331,000 
£12,047,600 
£12,661,765 
£14,422,732 
£13,582,000 
£13,231,400
1Hansard1 s, CXCIV, 1111? B. S. P., XXXVII (1872), 4; 
B. S_. P., XL (1873), 3.
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